



THE NATURE OF SECURITY- DRIVEN DIPLOMACY IN EXECUTING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: NADAPAL BELT KENYA-SOUTH SUDAN BORDER

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ABSTRACT

Security driven-diplomacy has attracted wide contestations as a preponderant tool for heralding new frontiers in executing counterintelligence operations. As a state-hinged ideology, diplomacy is enhanced through security and security apparatuses. The international pledge of fostering diplomacy through security agencies percolates down through continental, regional niche, to transnational setting as well as national territoriality. Security and diplomacy are both in a process of transformation and the transformative agenda boils down to underscoring security as a driving agent of diplomatic ventures in executing counterintelligence operations. Despite the lead role played by the agencies in entrenching diplomatic forays, counterintelligence operations have largely been elusive, its actors evasive and abrasive. This article was underpinned by one key objective: to examine the nature of security- driven diplomacy in executing counterintelligence operations with reference to the Nadapal belt along Kenya-South Sudan border. This article recommends that, other than the state being the major actor in security-driven diplomacy, a more fused and collaborative umpire should be established along the belt so as to expeditiously deal with latent cross-border affairs.

KEY WORDS: Security driven-diplomacy (SDD), Counter-Intelligence Operations (CIOs), national territoriality.

I. INTRODUCTION

Security driven-diplomacy now takes considerable time and resources. It has emerged as a new mode of post-modernist ideology employed to consolidate competent minds in the securitization agenda of states. By and large, many diplomatic pundits argue that security driven-diplomacy should not be used for other purposes, but in an interdependent world, in which the concept would serve as an extraterritorial role (Nolan, 2009). Globally, many governments are often not clear about their motives behind the rationale of security driven-diplomacy, when foreign interests are advanced. This scenario has provided a monumental barrier in state's major role in employing security-driven diplomacy. Perhaps, a new way to run the world (Nolan, 2009).

The information age is rapidly shaping the contours of security-driven diplomacy. The crafting as well as practicing of SDD has been epitomized by porous border challenge in defining national sovereignty as well as integrity. The conduct of war in

either benign or malign state has largely shaped relations (Doyle, 1997). Additionally, the volatility and interconnectivity exhibited by complex shifts in international security pose serious questions to the changing dynamics of security agenda. Consequently, the unprecedented shift warrants traditional security priorities and innovative practices that engender security-driven diplomacy. Prioritization of resilience-themed network strategy by the United States (US), for example, is explicated by the need for credible influence other than coercion, participation other than exclusion, transparency instead of secrecy, and sustainment instead of containment (Kalathil, 2013). Such prioritization is key in any security setting.

In as much as a number of literature have focused on the nexus between security and intelligence, the incongruity in counterintelligence as well as counterintelligence operations do not respond well to failing states, hence preservation of dignity or contagious extremist ideology witnessed in various parts of the world, especially in the horn of Africa.



Therefore, in order for counterintelligence operations to be expeditious, security driven-diplomacy umpire is needed to oversee as well as advocate for sound security initiatives.

According to Buchere and Jonyo (2011), security threats in Africa, are as a result of state vulnerabilities that are attributed to ethnic polarizations that coalesce with weak economic bases and military-like social formations. Whereas Buchere and Jonyo allude to options of strengthening security sector, fragmentary thoughts and mechanisms are referred to as far as security driven diplomacy is concerned. Further, while African countries, from embattled Congo Brazaville, to terrorist marooned Chad and Nigeria, have employed sustained efforts in pursuing security driven-diplomacy, to a large degree, counterintelligence operations have remained elusive.

Furthermore, regional security underpinnings have been characterized by strong-willed actors whose collaborative efforts have borne little results. The establishment of regional security communities in various parts of Eastern Africa has been trajectory in nature. However, dearth of political will and mutual trust has greatly stymied these initiatives. For instance, the formation of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought Development (IGGAD) in 1986, later succeeded by IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) in 1996, with broader security mandate, has exercised little preference to security driven-diplomacy. Besides, the establishment of Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and EASBRIG, has had little impact on executing counterintelligence operations (Buchere and Jonyo, 2011).

Popular narrative generally holds that, time and distance are collapsing. Disproportionate and ever increasing power, pitting state actors versus non-state actors, is attributed to diverse ambiguity in the concept of security (Buchere and Jonyo, 2011). This offers a piecemeal thinking that does not adequately appreciate security driven-diplomacy. If as Faris (2013) notes, modern diplomacy of which SDD is an appendage, and has traditionally been defined as the practice of crafting open covenants, secretly arrived at, then the heightened employability of SDD in the recent history should not be a worrisome matter.

Albeit critics of SDD have contended that security driven-diplomacy is a linear and unpredictable approach in executing CIOs, they myopically eschew the fact that security-driven diplomacy involves communication, planning, gathering information as well as transferring, commanding and controlling networks from seemingly isolated locations. The flipside of the coin is also important. The agility to conflate security driven-diplomacy and CIOs,

explicates the inertia of past practices in security, in attempting to parse the language of SDD with abstractions. This paper canvasses the nature of SDD by looking at the transnational actors as well as the driving factors of CIOs.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research paper was underpinned by securitization theory. By applying the argument of 'national security', the chief question, as to what security is, is very integral in deciphering the applicability of this theory to security-driven diplomacy. In traditional, realist thinking, security can be understood as the freedom from military threat. However, the post-cold war era, characterized by scholars of the Copenhagen School, developed securitization theory as part of a broader attempt to redefine the concept of security (Emmers, 2007). Besides, military security, this wider understanding of security includes political, societal, economic, and environmental security. Williams and Micheal (2003), moot that, within securitization theory, the concept of security "is not treated as an objective condition, but as the outcome of a specific social process". Thus, securitization theory takes a constructivist approach to the study of security. In essence, scholars studying securitization pose the question, "what counts as a security problem?" (Balzacq, 2011).

Since the emergence of as well as the development of the Copenhagen school, securitization theory has been largely criticized and further developed by other scholars. Currently, there are three main approaches to the study of security. Besides the Copenhagen School, the most prominent approaches are the Paris School and the Welsh school. There are several fundamental differences between the philosophical, sociological and normative approaches to securitization.

The normative approach includes scholars from the Welsh school and focuses primarily on the conditions for individual security from a wide variety of threats, instead of a state centered security approach. This explains the rationale of this theory in SDD along the belt. The philosophical approach includes scholars working from a post-structuralism approach, including scholars of the Copenhagen school (Balzacq, 2011). They believe in the power that language holds; something becoming a security threat is inherent to the act of saying it (Buzan *et al*, 1998). In nuce, they argue that security is a speech act (Balzacq, 2011).



III.METHODOLOGY

The research paper employed descriptive survey as well as cross-cultural design. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), descriptive research determines and reports the way things are. Busaha and Harter (1980) observe that the overall purpose of the

descriptive survey is to obtain comprehensive information from every member of population of interest. Its primary advantage is the opportunity it affords for thorough, detailed examination and analysis of the research problem so that findings can be applied directly to the subject under study.




Figure 1.1: A map showing area of study-Nadapal Belt, Kenya-South Sudan Border.

Source: Researcher, 2018

Based on the sample of 384, the following categories of respondents were selected: Household heads; government officials, Non-States Actors and FGD participants. Random and purposive sampling was used to determine the distribution of 384 respondents.

The purpose of sampling was to secure a representative group which enabled the researcher to gain information about the population. Nadapal belt and the selected areas have a population of more than 10000, therefore, the desired sample population was determined using Fisher's formula for sample size determination (cited in Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999:43). The formula is stated thus:

$$n = \frac{z^2 pq}{d^2}$$

Where n=desired sample size (the target population is greater than 10,000).

z=the standard normal deviate at the confidence level of 95% is 1.96.

p=the proportion of the target population estimated to have characteristics being measured is set at 50%

q=1-p (probability of non-success)

d=level of statistical significance set at 0.05

$$n = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times 0.5 \times (1-0.5)}{(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = 384$$

IV.FINDINGS

A. Actor's Role in security Driven Diplomacy

This research paper sought to ascertain the role played by various actors in security driven diplomacy and consequently the influence on CIOs along the Nadapal belt. The results are as shown in figure 1.2.




Figure 1.2 Significant rating of Actor's Role in security Driven Diplomacy by the Respondents at Nadapal belt, Kenya-South Sudan border

Source: Field Data, 2018

❖ State Machinery

The results in figure 1.2 attest that, out of 300 respondents, 219 (73%) respondents rated the state machinery as significant actor in security driven diplomacy while 81 (27%) respondents avouched that state machinery was insignificant as far as SDD is concerned along the belt. According to the respondents, state machinery includes the state itself, its personnel and the arsenals used in administration. They reasoned that the presence of police, the Kenya police reserve and the Rural Police Patrol Unit (RPPU) and the military, was an indication that security issues were a concern of the state and a prerogative of the state in general. However, those of contrary opinion averred that the presence of the state and its tools was as good as it was not there, since they did not feel any role that has been played by the state machinery along the belt.

The foregoing results were corroborated by FGD findings where participants confirmed that state machinery was a preponderant actor. One of the participants posited that:

Serikali (the government) has played important role in emphasizing the need for security but the efforts are still not enough. The government has put in place the Kenya Police reserve (KPR) which better understands the landscape and Rural Police Patrol Unit (RPPU) to set roadblocks and pursue the intruders (FGD respondent 13th.September, 2018,Lokichogio Ward).

Recognizing border porosity and regional volatility, the Kenya government has put a raft of measures to improve cross-border security. Rodriguez (2014) posits that to help Kenya's security institution, securing its national territory and dealing with counter insurgency is key. These counterintelligence operation along with multi-thronged efforts of transnational military operations, have to some extent thwarted the efforts of Toposa aggression into the Kenya land. In addition to CIOs and recent strategic military location, SDD has assisted Kenya in battling insurgency (Rodriguez, 2014).

Kenyan government albeit in the lead to promote safe border, has collaborated with the U.S which has led to improvement of security institutions, thereby building sustainable diplomatic relations. Consequently, the military, as a state machinery has played a pivotal role in diplomacy (Pajtinka, 2016).Pajtinka postulates that the military performs several key functions including (i) gathering and analyzing of information on the armed forces and security situation in the receiving state,(ii) promotion of communication, mutual engagements, cooperation between sending state and receiving state and receiving state (Kenya and South Sudan) respectively,(iii) organizing of working visits of defense authorities among other key roles. In the broadest sense, the efficacy of military is understood as a set of all non-violent foreign policy activities of programs of states implementation where emphasis is laid on external security of Kenya. In the narrowest sense, military engagement has been seen as diplomatic activities of defense ministry with the aim of promoting



interests of the state. Rusinak characterizes military engagement as “the activity of military diplomats focused on political and security issues.”

In the historical context therefore, the Kenyan military was deployed along the border. This is in respect to diplomatic negotiations within the broad spectrum of Versailles Peace Conference. Dubrin (2015), postulates that, analyzing the personality of state actor on transnational relatives, state as an actor emerges as critical opinion shaper when it takes into consideration the view of other authorities. This is essential in SDD as a preponderant tool in CIOs.

❖ Non-State Actors

Non-state entities are also key players in security-driven diplomacy. The results in figure 1.2 indicate that 195 (65%) of the respondents stated that non-state entities significantly played a role in SDD along the belt, conversely 105 (35%) of the respondents indicated that non-state entities insignificantly played any role in SDD.

Among those interviewed, lobby groups, religious groups and aid agencies featured as important non-state entities along the belt.

These findings were corroborated by FGD participants who indicated that:

There are many organization that are locally stationed. They perform various functions. We have Oxfam, Education for all, LOKADO (Lotus Kenya Action for Development), and Red Cross. They are involved in security issues, negotiation and peaceful settlements of disputes. They also support operations of the police and military by providing important information. (FGD respondents 13/9/2018, Lokichogio Ward).

The foregoing is underpinned by Hall (1997) who posits that, the non-governmental organizations facilitate communication between individuals of interest. They also work as pressure group to change government policies and offer critical information-gathering resources. This is most often when no other reliable source exists or is scuttled. Since 1972 when the Stockholm Declaration was promulgated, non-state entities have played significant roles in a number of issues. First, they have established channels of communication that have been used by state representative in order to conduct intergovernmental negotiations. Second, they have informed national as well as international players on conflict and security issues. Besides, the NGOs have emerged as an important partners to both national and government international agencies where issues pertaining to

diplomacy, and counterintelligence discourses have been fronted and delved upon.

More often than not, intergovernmental bodies have been mooching and slowing with emerging crisis situation. However, NGOs capitalize on institutional and political limitation of the state agencies to operate in very difficult circumstances (Weidenbaum, 2009). Consequently, the non-state entities of which NGOs forms quintessential part, have been critical in understanding CIOs along the belt. Though in functional terms non-states entities cannot invariably be distinguishable from state, since they are at times forms of quasi-government organizations, there are still functional overlaps between what non-state do and states activities. State wield much power in SDD and influence non-state entities in CIOs. For instance, there exists complexities of practice and functions, thus a clear cut autonomy from the structure and machinery of the state override the mandate of non-state in SDD and consequently influence CIOs. Weidenbaum (2009) postulates that state take advantage of non-state. This resonates with respondents who asserted that non-state entities play insignificant role in SDD. Apparently, this is a plausible reason. Overall, non-state entities are significant actors in security-driven diplomacy.

❖ Media

Additionally, 165 (55%) of the respondents were of the contrary opinion and stated that the media is an insignificant actor in SDD while 135 (45%) of the respondents said that the media is significant. Among those who exhibited contrary opinion, understood media as channels of communication such as television and radios.

In light of this assertion, the participants in the FGD stated that:

The media is important but in many occasion it is bias. It favors some sectors and ignore other players in security matters. For instance, the media both local and international have pictured our region as no go zone areas and this affects our relationship with both the government and the non-government players. Therefore, we see the media as playing not much role in security and diplomacy, because this gives attackers from neighboring country an opportunity to take advantage of our areas and carry out attacks. (FGD participants, 14/9/18, Nadapal)

Research from other scholarly work confirm that, media is inexorably important channel linking the



world. It presents undeniable opportunity to create sentiments and shape relations. With expanded universal, regional and transnational reliance, clustered proximity and ubiquitous aggressiveness, the role of the media cannot be gainsaid (Young, 2014). Wolfsfeld (2004) further avers that, the media has assumed a vital role in emancipation of communities and promoting security and peace-building. Significantly, the media has played key informative roles in Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Rwanda. However, in SDD, the media has been lackluster and bias to advance sentiments that are in tandem with what they wish.

Though virtual media and cyber diplomacy have emerged as critical appendage of SDD, numerous opportunities in the social media platforms have not been exploited. Consequently, the media has not accelerated SDD to a level of influencing CIOs. Media influences perspectives and affects public opinion. Thus, in SDD, the media has emerged as a new frontier, an aggressive propaganda machinery thus leading to miscues in CIOs. Media's primacy along the belt is still elusive considering adaptability to porous terrain.

❖ Citizens

Besides, 210 (70%) of the respondents indicated that the citizens plays a preponderant role in SDD whereas 90 (30%) of the respondents were of the contrary opinion. This implied that local residents get the support they require from the government in dealing with counterintelligence operations. The local citizens play significant role in CIOs. Among the respondents who agreed that local residents play a vital role in SDD, communication factor emerged as an important interplay in counterintelligence operations. They argued that they are better informed when information is conveyed to them via the media and other channels of communication. Citizen-oriented roles that shape SDD understanding were among the most effective methods of making residents engage actively in CIOs. Further, partnership with the government was deemed vital. It is at grassroot level that citizens can aid agencies and forward critical information needed for CIOs. The respondents were in agreement that local meetings and advisory committee were avenues for providing information and providing feedback on how counterintelligence can be conducted.

❖ South Sudan belligerents

From figure 1.2, 234 (78%) of the respondents indicated that the South Sudan belligerents played an insignificant role in SDD along the belt and 66 (22%) of the respondents stated that the South Sudan belligerent played a significant role in SDD. This response revealed a compelling feeling of respondents

that the South Sudan belligerents' role in SDD was insignificant. They attributed this to the incessant invasions and attacks by the Toposa, who more often than not, have had a predilection of invading the Turkana community.

They opined in this manner: the South Sudan belligerents are nebulous in their operations and hardly engage security personnel in breaking truce and resolving conflict. The foregoing was corroborated by an interview with a Kenya Police Reserve officer, who asserted that:

Kundi haramu ya Sudanese inatuhangaisha sana katika mpaka. Inatushambulia sisi kila mara, wanachukua, mifigo yetu, bibi zetu na hawataki kukutana na sisi tuongee. Hawataki kuhusishwa na serikali yao, hawataki serikali yetu. Wanajifanya wanakuja biashara kumbe wanakusanyika kutushambulia. Tumepata hasara kubwa. (The South Sudan belligerent group disturbs us a lot along the border. It attacks us every time, they take our cattle, wives and they don't want to meet us and dialogue. They don't want to be involved by their government, they also don't want to be involved with our government. They disguise themselves in business forays only to attack us. We have greatly run at a loss (Interview with Kenya Police Reserve officer, 14/9/2018, Lokichogio Ward).

The antecedent assertion suggests that, Kenya – South Sudan diplomatic miscues is long predated by South Sudan's independence. However, it is the alleged competition between Sudan and Uganda for armed proxies that have woven a terrible and fearful fabric of belligerence. The ongoing dispute over shared border, support for armed groups and distribution of revenues along the border have been a fodder for belligerence acts. In 2013, the South Sudan belligerence launched a scathing attack on Kiir's government, though with tacit support of U.S, Kiir's government survived (Reuters, 2018)

This research paper notes that the intra-state conflict pitting the belligerent and the state, has led to devastation of economic mainstays. This is due to the blunders in oil exploration that have influenced the conflict between President Slava Kiir and his former *numero dos*, Riek Machar, as the resource is used to support each other militarily. With Chinese prospecting oil in South Sudan, the belligerent feel that 'aliens' ought to be driven away. Consequently, this has led to migration and some of the belligerents find their way



across the border, Kenya-South Sudan (Dziadosz, 2012).

The North –West part of Turkana County, particularly the Nadapal belt, has been a conduit for belligerent to enter into Kenya. Besides, the North West region has been surveyed to have viable and prospective oil deposits and therefore seen new oil prospect zone along the border of the two countries (KPMG, 2013).Overly, the research noted that the East Africa, is at inflection point thus augmenting its muscles in development trajectories. However, SDD has not been successful in countering the belligerent acts. This research paper noted that the South Sudan belligerent played huge role in thwarting efforts of SDD in CIOs rather than constructively contributing to the question of stability .Therefore, in near future, the operations of SSD are likely to escalate in unprecedented level, hence the need to rethink SDD as deterrence mechanism rather than offensive approach (Angelo & Mc Guinness,2012).The research paper observed that the Nadapal belt has become more contentious and dubbed ‘ellipse of instability’. This is due to the fact that cross border raids and tensions between communities in Turkana and Toposa fuel further destabilization in the region thus impacting negatively on border security. Thus, political and economic dilemmas have curtailed

Kenya’s role in making major contributions in strengthening state authority in South Sudan.

❖ Kenyan Insurgents

Interestingly, 195 (65%) of the respondents agreed that the Kenyan insurgents played a significant role in SDD while 105 (35%) of the respondents indicated that Kenyan insurgents played insignificant role in SDD. Kenyan citizens who identify themselves with cross-border intrusion have incessantly intruded to the neighboring South Sudan. According to the respondents, Kenyan insurgents pursue their opponents as aggrieved and disgruntled men, who see fighting as panacea to their problem rather than engaging in diplomatic ways to resolve their grievances. From the foregoing findings, it is evident that both the media and South Sudan belligerent played insignificant role in security driven diplomacy while state machinery, non-state entities, local citizens and Kenya insurgents played significant role in SDD.

B. Driving factors for CIOs at Nadapal belt, Kenya-South Sudan border

This research paper sought to determine whether the respondents understood the factors influencing counterintelligence operations. The results are as indicated in figure 1.3




Figure 1.3 Understanding the driving factors for CIOs at Nadapal belt, Kenya-South Sudan border
 Source: Field Data, 2018



❖ South Sudan Wrangles

From figure 1.3, the results show that, out of 300 respondents, 225 (75%) of the respondents acknowledged and rated South Sudan wrangles as very prevalent and noted that they have led to CIOs, whereas 15 (5%) of the respondents stated that South Sudan wrangles were prevalent, on the same note, 15 (5%) of the respondents stated that the South Sudan wrangles were not prevalent. Besides, 45 (15%) of the respondents stated that the South Sudan wrangles were somehow prevalent. The respondents who asserted that the wrangles in South Sudan were common, attributed this phenomenon to continued broken peace deals. However, those of the opinion that wrangles are not common were optimistic and exuded a harbinger of hope that brokering of peace yields better results. These findings were further corroborated by a South Sudanese fugitive who adduced that:

There is much conflict in my country. The fight is between Riek Machar's (Nuer militia) versus Salva Kiir's government. They fight to control key resources. They don't want dialogue. They meet in peace agreements but renege on their promises. They make us look like we are not human beings. Since we got independence, it is like we are not independent. We are under new colonial masters who try to liberate themselves and not us. The fighting have led to people fleeing away to find peace. Some move to occupy new territories and control them (Interview with South Sudan Fugitive, 18/9/18, Lokichogio Ward).

Additionally, the FGD participants opined that:

We hear a lot of information about South Sudan's conflict. We see many of them run to our country in search of peace and home to stay. They tell us that their country is unstable. They are afraid that the government and the opposition will continue fighting if nothing is done. Their families are broken, killed and raped. Sometimes we are afraid of interacting with them for fear of being reprimanded by our police officers. (FGD respondent, 18/9/18, Lokichogio Ward).

The foregoing proffer that, conflict is indubitable. Those responsible for security, cause conflict which further escalate wrangles in the society. Societies large and small are caught in the conflict

traps with democratic illusions, political tensions and rebellions, a common affair. Apparently, South Sudan is a story of two worlds, two visions; Salva and Machar. Compounding the South Sudan situation is total impunity and a breakdown of law and order which has allowed violence and organized banditry to flourish. Though the backdrop of South Sudan wrangles was the heightened cessation that led to independence of South Sudan, the proxy opposition groups have threatened to annihilate the pillars of democratic progress made so far.

This has exacerbated security efforts and consequently provided rich environment for tension to sour high. South Sudan wrangles coupled with fragile justice system and resource conflict have left populations in grievous security abyss dominated by impunity. Civilians, including remote villages, refugees- internally displaced persons have been victims of intimidation and physical attacks. Though internal and border security have been declared first priority for South Sudan Republic, pockets of insecurity in South Sudan are pervasive and more often than not, go unreported (Khabure, 2013). This has been critical considering the fact that South Sudan is still struggling with post referendum, and post – independence domination battles between the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk.

Khabure (2013) avers that the South Sudan wrangles coupled with domination and constraints on political space remains a major source of long simmering discontent. Knopf (2016) observes that the South Sudan wrangles have increasingly posed a threat to regional stability and the security strategy of U.S partners in the region with particular emphasis on the fact that the key partners in the region, Kenya included, have a propensity of undertaking unilateral military operations interventions with unpredictable results on operations to provide life support to Africa younger nation. The South Sudan nation wrangles have aggravated intra-regional tensions with spill-over effects. Comparatively, Sudan and Uganda have had a long-standing rivalry on border points, Uganda and Ethiopia have been embroiled in hegemonic competition for regional kingship thus exacerbating South Sudan hugger-mugger state. This has warranted international trusteeship as suggested by David Lake and Christopher Faris, political Scientist. These pundits opine that international transitional administration should come at the request of the South Sudanese government. Consequently, South Sudan wrangles can be turned to an opportunity that shapes CIOs along the belt.

Khabure (2013) further attribute wrangles and tension to weakened legal systems and perception of



civil societies as new opposition frontiers for the government. This has simmered tensions, thus the most serious outcome of persistent wrangles in South Sudan has been the increased tensions between communities. These tensions, as argued by Khabure are as a result of exploiting categorization of individuals by political factions and ethnic polarization. The resources too, latent or non-existent have a dimension of identity politics where Christians and Muslims conflict along religious lines and retreat to keep vital information that may be useful in CIOs.

❖ Proliferation of Small Arms

The results also revealed that out of 300 respondents, 219 (73%) stated that proliferation of small arms was very prevalent, 48 (16%) of the respondents indicated that proliferation of small arms was prevalent, 24 (8%) of the respondents also stated that proliferation of small arms was somehow prevalent and 9 a representation of 3%, stated that proliferation of small arms was not prevalent. Intra-community battlements and confrontations, retaliatory attacks and quest for self-defense have been anchors for many ethnic militias and insurgent group formations.

To a larger extent, the respondents agreed that proliferation of SALW was widespread along the belt and counter-proliferation actions that would include detection, monitoring and preparedness to conduct counter-proliferation operations, was necessary. Conversely, those who said that a proliferation of SALW was not prevalent were either those who participate in proliferation or those who didn't have an idea of what proliferation entailed. According to Khabure (2013), proliferation of small arms is majorly attributed to trivialization of unpunished violence. The conflict between the Turkana and the Toposa is also attributed to apparent dearth of information on the source of small arms used majorly in raids. Further, Khabure moots that disarmament and demobilization programmes along the border have been weak due to ineffective and unsuccessful re-integration of combatants. Additionally, both Kenya and South Sudan have failed to provide security for local citizens and therefore the locals take matters of security in their hands. Consequently, CIOs becomes a remote affair conducted by amorphous groups.

Quintessentially, the Northern West part of Kenya and South Sudan have been characterized by human suffering and uncertainties, largely due to onset of 2013 South Sudan civil war. The proliferation of SALW stems mainly from the post-independence of Kenya and South Sudan and has exacerbated the plight of civilian population. These weapons have been used and are now in use in the fight over resources and cattle

rustling, thus contributing to violent crimes. Gikonyo (2015), moots that SALW filters beyond armies and police forces. For instance, amongst the Turkana-Toposa pastoralist, arms are acquired directly for security purposes. With unfettered infiltration being the case, armed criminality and saturation of arms therefore becomes the order of operations.

During cold war, arms control negotiations focused on nuclear bombs, aircraft and ballistic missiles. The post-cold war dispensation has witnessed uncontrolled proliferation and stockpiling of small arms. This has prompted the need to gather and disseminate information so as to better handle proliferation of SALW. Wepundi (2011), opines that, Kenya has contended with SALW for over decades now. Though SALW predates Kenya's colonial era, illicit possession of arms along the border has punctured CIOs efforts. The non-state actors have also been incriminated in proliferation of SALW. They have exploited SALW to perpetuate conflict between communities.

As stated in UN Firearms Protocol of 2001, article three:

The Firearms Protocol regulates firearms, their parts and components and ammunition (art. 3); the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) applies "to all conventional arms within the following categories: (a) battle tanks; (b) armored combat vehicles; (c) large calibre artillery systems; (d) combat aircraft; (e) attack helicopters; (f) warships; (g) missiles and missile launchers; and (h) small arms and light weapons.

The Arms Trade Treaty also requires State Parties to carry out "import and export risk assessment" concerning:

The potential that the conventional arms or items: (a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security; (b) could be used to: (i) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law; (ii) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law; (iii) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party; or (iv) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State is a Party" (art. 7).



The researcher noted that despite SDD being employed along the border, tracing of SALW is still elusive and international tracing instrument only proffers a national prerogative that call states to (i) identify and trace in timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons and (ii) to promote and facilitate international cooperation and effectiveness of existing bilateral, regional and international agreement to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

Regionally, it has been agreed that reining in the proliferation requires regional commitment. This is so, since small arms proliferation has led to devastating consequences. In other studies done in Samburu and Laikipia counties, Kenyan government's response to SALW has been faulted though improvement in security has been attributed to disarmament and reduced banditry. Same efforts can be replicated along Kenya South Sudan border, Nadapal belt in particular.

Those questioned argued that the prevalence of proliferation of SALW is also attributed to poor governance, lack of education, proximity to South Sudan and unemployment.

❖ Ethnic Tensions and Conflict

The results in figure 1.3 also revealed that, 213 (73%) of the respondents stated that ethnic tensions and conflict was very prevalent, additionally, 51 (17%) of the respondents stated that ethnic tensions and conflict were somehow prevalent, 30 (10%) of the respondents overly stated that tensions were prevalent and on the contrary, 6(2%) of the respondents said that ethnic tensions and conflict were not prevalent. The majority of the respondents, therefore avouched that culture has played a big role in fuelling ethnic tensions and conflict. The respondents argued that since the Turkana and the Toposa share cross-border identities, it was common a knowledge that, they would want to cement their relations through raids and clandestine attacks. However, on the contrary, those who did not see ethnic tensions as an issue identified the aggression between the two communities as a common a fair and there was or will there be a need to unite the two communities.

Incompatible interests, inequitable access to political space and intergroup competition are a source of ethnic tensions (Shulika & Uzodike, 2013). These scholars further propound that, ethnic tensions result from disharmony and inequalities that are rooted in ethnic cleavages. Conflicts in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo have influenced security dimensions as far as diplomacy is concerned. The prevalence of ethnic tensions and conflict along the belt is due to operations of Turkana and Toposa communities'. Initially, the

Toposa exploited other points of entry into North Western side of Turkana but the focus shifted enormously due to the quest for oil prospects and border permeability.

❖ Dimensions of Ethnic tensions and Conflict along Nadapal Belt

Security and peace discourses are dominating tools that shape counterintelligence operations along the belt. Conflicts along the border are believed to occur due to government's failure to gather sufficient information on ethnic instabilities and primordial selections of laborers and *de facto* denial to participate in key policy issues. Another dimension that worsen security efforts along the belt, centers on the issues of cattle rustling, raids and pasture thus the internecine conflicts and tensions have stymied the gathering, analysis and sustained evaluation of information on CIOs. The upsurge of ethnic tensions and conflict is demographically linked to disillusioned youths who have rallied to communal obligations to militate against invasion by either Toposa or Turkana.

In other studies, Jok (2014), postulates that the significance and opportunities offered by ethnic conflict and tensions should not be ignored or underestimated.

❖ Porous Border

Besides, the results in figure 4.8 reveal that 138 (46%) of the respondents stated that porous border was very prevalent, 114 (40%) of the respondents also indicated that porous border was prevalent and indeed was a driving factor for CIOs along the belt. Additionally, 30 (10%) stated that porous border was somehow prevalent and 18 (6%) of the respondents contradicted their counterparts and said that porous border was not prevalent. The existence of the border shared by Kenya and South Sudan is itself a periodic contributor to counterintelligence activities. The principle role that security and diplomacy play has to a greater extent been attributed to apparent paucity of information on border porosity and its implication. The research established that despite the prevalence of border porosity, patrol activities of both Kenya and South Sudan states have been conducted. This, however, contradicted with other respondent's view who noted that porous border is not ubiquitous.

Other studies have shown that, on the Kenya-Ethiopia border, militia and Ethiopian paramilitary forces had crossed into Kenya to commit devastating livestock raids (Karimi, 2003). Akin to this scenario has been the case of Kenya-South Sudan border. Comparatively, Amutabi (2011) contends that Illemi Triangle belongs to Kenya.



This understanding has compounded the situation as far as militarization of the border is concerned, hence perpetuating instability among the Turkana, Toposa and Nyangatom (Amutabi, 2011). Consequently, efforts of gathering reliable information on community identity has posed serious security threat and thwarted security efforts to broker peace diplomatically along the border disputants. As a matter of interest, communities found along Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan border are closely interlinked and verily related. Common language and a culture of stealing cattle has however complicated relations. The Toposa are found in South Omo in Ethiopia and in South Sudan. The Dassanech and Turkana are cross border neighbors with cross border identities. Interestingly and quite strategically, the case of Uganda is quite different because of improved security that has limited proliferation of weapons (Ngieiywa 2008; Mkutu 2007, 2003). In nuce, the majority of the respondents (46%) affirmatively responded to the question and noted that border porosity is very prevalent.

❖ Culture

From this research paper it also emerged that, 135 (45%) of the respondents indicated that the issue about culture was very prevalent along the belt, 99 (33%) of the respondents also indicated that culture was prevalent, 39 of the total respondents, a representation of 13 %, indicated that culture was somehow prevalent and conversely, 27 (9%) of the respondents did agree that culture was not prevalent. Culture takes center stage along the belt. It determines relations and outcomes of interaction between the Turkana and Toposa communities.

In analyzing culture, only the cultural factors that influence counterintelligence operations along the border and potential were deemed significant. The majority of the respondents avouched that cultural dimensions influenced their relations and how they interact. While an analysis of the Nadapal community as a whole provides some insight, the analysis should be restricted to those factors that affect the CIOs: security efforts.

Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) (2012) describes degrees of cultural understanding using the analogy of an iceberg. In one year's time, cultural awareness can be achieved yet this is just the tip of the iceberg. Understanding of culture requires two to five years and cultural competency takes 10 to 30 years. From this assertion, it can be argued that, culture underpins critical aspects of relation among the Nadapal community, thus its prevalence.

❖ Espionage

The results in figure 1.3 indicate that 234 (78%) of the respondents stated that espionage was very prevalent along the belt, 51 (17%) of the respondents indicated that espionage was prevalent, 15 (5%) of the respondents said that espionage activities were somehow prevalent.

The results also reveal that no respondent responded as to whether espionage activities were not prevalent. These findings indicated a level of awareness about espionage and espionage operations along the belt. The majority of the respondents (78%), who averred that espionage was so prevalent were either those who have been directly or indirectly involved in clandestine collection of information.

However, the lack of identification of the unavailability of espionage was attributed to lack of exposure to either overt or covert operations of those who seek for information about a targeted group or entity.

These findings resonated with one of the FGD respondents who avouched that:

We have been involved secretly in obtaining information from the South Sudanese nationals who cross the border. We share these information with the Kenya Police Reserve on weekly basis. Sometimes we meet them as a group and formalize our groups as vigilante and support the operations of police officers. However, there are those who fear engaging in this exercise. They view it as a patriotic act in disguise and a risky affair. We conduct our operations along the belt with the help of RPPU (FGD respondent, 14/9/2018, Nadapal).

These findings resonate with Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence, (2005) which explains espionage as the clandestine collection of information by people either in a position of trust for the targeted entity, or with access to people with such access. Milne & MacAskill (2015) have echoed these sentiments in another fashion that, Africa is 'El Dorado of espionage'. Africa has therefore emerged as a theatre of espionage, cesspool of international spying and cache of secret intelligence. This situation has escalated to transnational levels and influenced CIOs. Deeks (2015), further opines that "Espionage by definition is intended to occur without detection;" therefore, it is safe to assume that defining and regulating it brings significant complications. He further argues that, the forms and aims of espionage differ considerably, especially with the advent of technology.



On the other hand, espionage can also be defined as a “tool for the execution of policy as well as a tool to inform policy” (Scott & Jackson 2004). This definition adequately splits espionage into its two categories: covert operations (a tool for the execution of policy) and intelligence (a tool to inform policy). The first category, covert operations, consists of active operations which are actions a state takes to influence or affect a foreign sovereign that lack public endorsement by the state and usually remain classified or unfettered. Though the forms of covert operations can be classified as coercive covert operations, propaganda and political action (Treverton, 1988), these particular methods of these types of covert operations differ, primarily through the use of active forces and therefore the deployment of military forces, for example, along the border may significantly shift the nature of espionage activities along the belt.

Another category of espionage is covert intelligence which contains two strands, that is, collection of information and analysis of that information (Radson, 2007). This category also involves three variants: human intelligence (HUMINT), that include active agents who through sustained and systematic network collect information; Signal intelligence (SIGINT), that include electronic surveillance or imagery intelligence (IMINT) such as satellite reconnaissance. These methods provide vital information the state need on security, decision making, foreign policy and understanding future behavior of its constituents. The state therefore, would need this information for counterespionage and understand that intelligence is an important part of state security and diplomacy practice, and the secrecy attached to it, thus a crucial implication on counterintelligence operations.

Spycraft the old chestnut, as reemerged as a new tool in the modern diplomatic dispensation as a vital security component. Hacking of classified documents, stealing of vital information is now pervasive across territories and communities.

Hulnick (2004:10) affirms that:

Espionage—is the use of spies or secret agents to steal information from enemies, adversaries, or competitors—is one of the oldest forms of intelligence gathering.”

Summarily, it can be said that espionage entails various elements that underpin espionage operations. These include spycraft :the art of basically spying for information from a target entity, getting the contact of the spies and mode of communication, method of collecting information, the motive or the reward as well as tradecraft-buying and selling information for purposes of helping in identifying threats.

V.RECOMMENDATION

Other than the state being the major actor in security-driven diplomacy, this research recommends that, a more fused and collaborative umpire should be established along the belt so as to expeditiously deal with latent and non-existent cross-border affairs. The state needs to decentralize security apparatuses, that is, the detectives handling security strategies. Both the National Intelligence Services, should have their experts working in security-prone areas. These experts should work along non-state actors for proper, expeditious and faster communication in handling security matters and consequently averting as well as precluding external threats.

VI.CONCLUSION

This research paper concludes that, critical assessment for contemporary security debate that lean on the back of diplomacy is preponderant. The nature of security-driven diplomacy has witnessed a paradigm shift. From traditional arrangement to a post-modern structure, the nature as well as the extent of security-driven diplomacy has transcended the national borders. The tectonic forces of politically inclined relations are shifting too, the old chestnut of security dilemma still reverberates loudly in the ear of security strategists and statist, at the present. Kenya and South Sudan are no exception. States are endlessly besieged by enormously intriguing subject of security driven diplomacy. Why? Because it has emerged as the fronted panacea to incessant threats that bedevils nations today, yet not well executed. Pundits argue that it is the antidote that arrests the modern social and political upheavals. However, this is still not the reality. It is therefore imperative of all stakeholders to be conscious of the “real” realities, that is, Kenya’s geo-strategic interest, the limping South Sudan, dealing with belligerents, border porosity, and building sufficient capacities for security and diplomacy.

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