PHILOSOPHICAL ESSENCE OF TOLERANCE AND ITS SOCIO-IDEOLOGICAL FEATURES

Maxmaraximov Alibek Chorshanbievich

Master, Faculty of Social Sciences,
National University of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

ABSTRACT
This article clarifies the philosophical essence of tolerance and its socio-ideological features. Furthermore, the importance of tolerance in the system of national development a general definition of toleration that involves three interrelated conditions were discussed.
KEY WORDS: *tolerance, ideology, national consciousness, society*

DISCUSSION

According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the English words, "tolerate", "toleration", and "tolerance" are derived from the Latin terms tolerare and tolerantia, which imply enduring, suffering, bearing, and forbearance. Ancient Greek terms, which may also have influenced philosophical thinking on toleration, include: phoretos which means bearable, endurable, or phoreo, literally "to carry"; and anektikos meaning bearable, sufferable, tolerable, from anexo, "to hold up".

Today, when we say that someone has a "high tolerance for pain," we mean that he or she is able to endure pain. This ordinary way of thinking is useful for understanding the idea of toleration and the virtue of tolerance: it underscores the fact that toleration is directed by an agent toward something perceived as negative. It would be odd to say, for example, that someone has a high tolerance for pleasure.

With this in mind, we can formulate a general definition of toleration that involves three interrelated conditions. When an agent tolerates something:

(1) the agent holds a negative judgment about this thing;

(2) the agent has the power to negate this thing;

(3) the agent deliberately refrains from negation.[1]

The first condition requires a negative judgment, which can be anything from disapproval to disgust. Judgment here is meant to be a broad concept that can include emotions, dispositions, tastes, and reasoned evaluations. This negative judgment inclines the agent toward a negative action toward the thing that is perceived as being negative. This broadly Stoic conception of judgment is a common assumption in discussions of toleration. Defenders of toleration assume that we can, to a certain extent, voluntarily control the expression of our negative reactions by opposing them with different, countervailing, judgments. Although judgments and emotions are both thought to have motivating force, they can be resisted by some other judgment, habit or virtue.

The entity toward which an agent has a negative judgment can be an event, an object, or a person, although with regard to tolerance as a moral and political disposition, the entity is usually thought to be a person. Although we speak of tolerating pain, for example, the moral and political emphasis is on tolerating some other person, a group of people, or their activities.

The second condition states that the agent has the power to negate the entity in question. Toleration is concerned with resisting the temptation to actively negate the thing in question. To distinguish toleration from cowardice or weakness of will the agent must have some capacity to enact his negative judgment. Toleration occurs when the agent could actively negate or destroy the person or object in question, but chooses not to. [1]

The word negate is used here in a broad sense that allows for a variety of negative reactions. Negative actions can include: expressions of condemnation, acts of avoidance, or violent attacks. The continuum of negations is decidedly vague. It is not clear, for example, whether condemnation and

avoidance are negations of the same sort as violent action. Despite the vagueness of the continuum of negative activities, the focal point of the second criterion is the power to negate: toleration is restraint of the power to negate.

The third condition states that the agent deliberately refrains from exercising his power to negate. Tolerant agents deliberately choose not to negate those things they view negatively. The negative formulation, 'not negating,' is important because toleration is not the same thing as positive evaluation, approbation, or approval.

Tolerant restraint of the negative judgment is supposed to be free and deliberate: one refrains from negating the thing because one has a reason not to negate it and is free to act. Good reasons for toleration are plural. They include: respect for autonomy; a general commitment to pacifism; concern for other virtues such as kindness and generosity; pedagogical concerns; a desire for reciprocity; and a sense of modesty about one's ability to judge the beliefs and actions of others. Each of these provides us with a reason for thinking that it is good not to negate the thing in question. As mentioned already, there also may be other non-tolerant reasons for refraining from negation: fear, weakness of will, profit motive, self-interest, arrogance, and so forth.

Although there are many reasons to be tolerant, traditional discussions have emphasized respect for autonomy and pedagogical concerns. Underlying both of these approaches is often a form of self-conscious philosophical modesty that is linked to the value of respect for autonomy. As John Stuart Mill and others have argued, individuals ought to be left to pursue their own good in their own way in part because each individual knows himself and his own needs and interests best. This view does, however, leave us with a lingering problem as toleration can easily slip toward moral skepticism and relativism. It is important to note then that toleration is a positive value that is not based upon total moral skepticism. Proponents of toleration think that toleration is good not because they are unsure of their moral values but, rather, because toleration fits within a scheme of moral values that includes values such as autonomy, peace, cooperation, and other values that are thought to be good for human flourishing. [1]

The issues of tolerance, the system of national consciousness and socio-ideological interests will be further supplemented, which confirms that Uzbek tolerance is a multifaceted and complex structural system. Thus, we are convinced that tolerance as a product of socio-ideological relations is a phenomenon corresponding to a particular cultural-historical state of society. It is a symbol of the society, the image of the environment, which pursues social and ideological interests, and reflects the mentality, human kindness, respect, love,

tolerance inherent in this society. In particular, tolerance as a socio-ideological phenomenon is reflected in the social dialogue of workers and their relations with the state and society, forming a system of socio-ideological interests. Such a relationship is not a substantive approach to the issue, but a proposal to draw the attention of leaders of state and public organizations to an important issue, to pay attention to the problem on the basis of justice or urgency, to reconcile their interests with the interests of society. This form of the phenomenon of tolerance is in the form of an objection or acknowledgment of the content of the idea of processes of managing the development of socio-ideological phenomena, characterized by public logic, conciseness and approach to problem solving through social ideological interests.

The diversity of opinions and views on the content of tolerance confirms that society is closely linked with the task of mass control of people's lives. The way of mass control of changes in social life, human behavior, is essentially composed of several appearances and forms. These are: the system of communication in the order of government agencies and institutions, tolerance expressed in relationships and meetings, obedience, respect for colleagues and leaders; to be patient with issues such as tolerance, which is expressed in everyday life, in relation to ordinary events and happenings, to express their views in a peaceful manner; The basis of tolerance is the manifestation of tolerance-oriented tendencies in the family, in the circle of friends. It also confirms not to put one's own interests above the interests of others, community, state, country, to understand the behavior of others, to be able to accept the opinion of society; the exchange of views on the socio-ideological and personal interests that occur during weddings and celebrations, which are characterized by tolerance, kindness, honesty, faith, compassion, equality, prudence, loyalty.

Continuing on the role of tolerance in the system of national consciousness and socio-ideological interests, we once again quote the views of the famous Eastern philosopher Abu Nasr al-Farabi. Regarding the characteristics of tolerance, he said: "There is no natural or voluntary connection between people, each person must harm the interests of others for his own benefit, one must be a stranger to the other, even if they unite because of necessity, obligation, even if they compromise, only one wins. In doing so, they are forced to come to terms with each other under the pressure of an external force, and if that power is lost, the agreement is lost, alienation reappears, and they disperse. This is one of the animalistic beliefs of humankind." Farabi said that people should live together voluntarily, not forcibly, so that conflicts would end and people could live together. In this way, the socio-ideological environment becomes a process that pursues the

interests of the people, emphasizing that through the connections between people, their personalities become harmonious and their character is enriched with universal feelings. According to Farabi, the interests of the people also form the basis of positive tolerance, such as national consciousness, social ideology.

Farabi describes this situation as follows: "Some people think that the connections between people are based on the commonality of their behavior, nature, verbs and language. Each nation has its own characteristics. Some people think that people's interdependence is based on the commonality of thoughts and places of residence in general." In this way, Farabi puts forward the idea of mutual social unity of people, emphasizing the need to think about the ethno-regional, geopolitical roots of kindness and tolerance for each other. This view is also emphasized by Abu Rayhan Beruni, who shows that the emergence of tolerance is inextricably linked with social relations, people's lifestyles, material needs, interests, demands and goals. For example, it shows that cooperation between people is due to the need for people to get rid of the needs of mutual integration and external threats together. As a result, the dependence of tolerance on the system of social and ideological interests of the national consciousness affects the development of such characteristics as peoples living in mutual respect, deviating from the interests of society and the state, focusing on national traditions, national values and national culture. Finally, the tolerance of our people has formed the spirit of national unity in Uzbekistan.

The concept of tolerance was not only related to not only the past, but also these days.

Tolerance is a moral virtue best placed within the moral domain – but unfortunately it is often confounded with prejudice. Much of the psychological research about tolerance generally and about the development of children's understanding of tolerance of others who are different from them has been examined through research about prejudice – and not through the moral domain. The assumption made is that absence of prejudice by default means a person is tolerant. Prejudice and tolerance are actually theoretically different concepts – and not the opposite of each other. In fact, they coexist in most of us.

Tolerance is difficult to define, which may have led to limiting the study of tolerance in psychology in favour of studying prejudice. But, unlike prejudice, tolerance can be grounded in the moral domain which offers a positive approach to examining relationships between groups of people who are different from each other.[2]

Based on its Latin origin, tolerance, or toleration as philosophers often refer to it, is most commonly viewed negatively as "putting up with" something we dislike or even hate. At the same time

tolerance cannot be indiscriminate. Indiscriminate acceptance in its most extreme form could lead to recognition of questionable practice and human rights violations.

Tolerance as a moral virtue. An alternative way for us to think of tolerance is to place it within the moral domain and recognise that it is what it is, a moral virtue. Many recent philosophers have linked tolerance with respect, equality and liberty. Those such as Michael Dusche, John Rawls and Michael Walzer among others, argue that we should regard tolerance as a positive civic and moral duty between individuals, irrespective of colour, creed or culture.

In other words, it is a moral obligation or duty which involves respect for the individual as well as mutual respect and consideration between people. Tolerance between people makes it possible for conflicting claims of beliefs, values and ideas to coexistence as long as they fit within acceptable moral values.

The idea that tolerance is a moral duty had been acknowledged by earlier civil libertarians, such as John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, John Stuart Mill and others. They argue that tolerant people value the individual, his or her independence and freedom of choice.

When tolerance is placed within the moral domain relating to fairness, justice and respect and avoiding causing harm to others, it can only be viewed as a positive moral virtue. Psychological research supports the idea that tolerance is better placed within the moral domain. [2]

Fairness and empathy are also very closely connected to moral development and reasoning. They are fundamental to any coherent moral philosophy. Psychologists such as Johnathan Haidt believe empathy is the most important motivator for moral behaviour. Others such as Martin Hoffman argue empathy is a motivator of prosocial and altruistic or unselfish behaviour.

Empathic people are sensitive to the thoughts, feelings and experiences of others. They are able to place themselves in someone else's shoes or understand how it would feel to be treated badly. Placing oneself in someone else's shoes is the essence of tolerance.

Some researches proved that people of all ages including children have a strong sense of fairness and empathy towards others different from them in colour, creed or culture. They reject prejudice and intolerance between 70% and 80% of the time affirming tolerance based on fairness and empathy.

Moral values such as fairness, justice, empathy, tolerance and respect are shared, if not universal, values relevant to dealing with human diversity

Tolerance examined as separate concept could have unique implications for education and

social policy. Education aimed at promoting a harmonious society could do well to focus more on the relationship between morality and tolerance. Grounding tolerance in theories of morality allows for an alternative educational approach to promote harmonious intergroup relationships.

Part of this education would involve developing a strong sense of fairness and justice and the ability to empathise with the plight of others who are different in racial characteristics, ethnicity or nationality.

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