



THE BEGINNING OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT FOR THE ABOLITION OF FOREIGN CONCESSIONS IN PERSIA AT THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY

Gabrielyan Sofya Ivanovna

National University of Uzbekistan named after Mirzo Ulugbek, Tashkent

ANNOTATION

The article deals with the events preceding the beginning of the Iranian revolution. The transformation of Iran into a semi-colony of Western states led to the beginning of the national liberation movement, which acquired various forms at the end of the 19th century. Under the pressure of popular, liberal and religious movements, the shah had to abolish the Tobacco Monopoly, which turned the country into a raw material appendage of Great Britain. This article also highlights the diplomatic struggle being waged by Russia to annul this monopoly.

KEYWORDS: *Iran, tobacco monopoly, Regia, liberal Iranian bourgeoisie, pan-Islamism, Shiite clergy*

INTRODUCTION

The transformation of Iran into a semi-colony at the end of the 19th century, accompanied by an exacerbation of antagonistic contradictions within the state, contributed to the development of national liberation tendencies among patriotic forces. The aggravation of contradictions stirred up not only the masses of working people in town and country, but also the nascent national bourgeoisie.

The surrender of important economic objects by the shah to foreigners, squandering of state receipts by the shah's court with a general decline in the administrative system could not but generate internal discontent in the country, accompanied by the formation of a bourgeois-liberal trend [1; 156].

RESEARCH METHODS

Objective-historical, historical-comparative, logical methods were used as the main methodological approaches for writing the article, which made it possible to take into account objective and subjective factors in the study of the main events that took place in the Middle East at the end of the 19th century, in general and in Persia, in particular.

RESEARCH RESULTS

The progressive people of Iran, and these are representatives of the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and liberal landowners, more and more felt the need to improve society and its movement along the path of progress.

The most prominent representative of the liberal trend in Iran was Mirza Melkom Khan. After completing his studies in France, he returned to Iran and in 1858 created the society "Adamiyyat" ("Humanity"), by its name, according to Melkom Khan, the society called on its supporters to "do good, humane deeds."

The "Adamiyyat" society included representatives of different wealthy strata of the population - aristocrats, including a number of civil servants, merchants, intellectuals (especially from among the listeners of "Darol-fonun"), dissatisfied with the existing order. The main ideas that Melkom Khan preached were: the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, a series of socio-economic, legal and cultural reforms in the country. He stood up for the freedom of the person and guarantees of private property, the equality of people before the law, the dissemination of the achievements of European science and culture in Iran. The latter was directly linked by him with the program of economic development of Iran: he stood on the positions of European bourgeois economists, believing that the welfare and development of the country depends "on the volume of products it produces." [2; 20]

In addition, Melkom Khan attached great importance to the accumulation of capital within the country, demanding for this to carry out appropriate reforms. He explained the economic backwardness of Iran, first of all, by the lack of national capital. And he stood for the creation of a national Iranian bank. The second impetus for improving the state's



economy can be attracting foreign capital to Iran, providing concessions to foreigners, mistakenly believing that foreign powers do not seek to seize the wealth of Iran or other countries of the East and that their interests are limited only to trade.

But the most noticeable contribution to the formation of national identity and the development of its ideological concepts was made by the "Adamiyat" society at the last stage of its activity in the 90s. XIX century. This period was characterized by especially pronounced dissatisfaction with the Shah's regime on the part of representatives of the national bourgeoisie, deep disappointment of the patriotic strata of the population in Iranian reality. In such conditions, society began to call for the unification of merchants, traders and other dissatisfied elements from among the intelligentsia and civil servants with the involvement of the highest clergy to fight for a change in the social system and the implementation of reforms. Undoubtedly, the expectation of attracting influential clergy was not made by chance, but taking into account their strength in the country, which the progressive strata hoped to use to achieve public goals.

Another bearer of the ideas of reformism in Iranian society was a movement that bore a religious connotation. The founder of the Pan-Islamist community "Ettekhod-e Eslam" ("Unity of Islam") was the spiritual leader Seyid Jamal ed-Din Asadabadi (al-Afghani), who gained immense popularity in the Muslim East. His teaching found warm support not only in Persia, but also in other states (India, Afghanistan, Turkey, Arabia, Egypt). Pan-Islamism in the conditions of semi-colonial, feudal Iran at the end of the 19th century. was the bearer of progressive tendencies, since the edge was directed against the imperial aspirations of England. However, this trend was reactionary.

Twice (in 1886 and 1889) Seyid Jamal ed-Din "visited" Iran, where he conducted propaganda against the Shah's order, called for the implementation of socio-political reforms in the country and the achievement of independence of the state, publicly spoke out against the lawlessness and poverty that reigned in Iran and illiteracy. Around him were grouped fairly broad strata of the capital's population, including a number of representatives of the clergy, civil servants, intellectuals, liberal-minded landowners and Tehran merchants.

Thus, the end of the XIX century. in Iran was characterized by the intensity of anti-feudal and anti-imperialist tendencies, the growth of class discontent with the emerging young Iranian bourgeoisie and the bourgeois-liberal intelligentsia associated with it - the bearer of the ideology advanced at that time.

This discontent soon spills over into one of the major revolutionary upheavals that swept almost the

entire country, in the struggle of the Iranian people against the English tobacco monopoly.

In such an "explosive" political situation, the Shah took an anti popular act, granting in March 1890 to Major Gerald Talbot a concession for a monopoly on the purchase, processing and sale of tobacco for a period of 50 years.

But the main organizer of this brilliant venture was Henry Drummont Wolff. Although it ended in failure, the beginning was quite promising. Wolff began working on this idea in April 1890 during the Shah's visit to London. Wolff introduced Nasr al-Din Shah to his friend Gerald Talbot. Wolff's support and bribes helped Talbot gain the monopoly. [1; 163]

The British government was behind this deal. The negotiation process took place under the tutelage of Lord Salisbury. British author N. Kaddy in his monograph "Religion and Rebellion in Iran" cites a document that conveys the content of the conversation between Talbot and the Shah after reaching an agreement on the tobacco monopoly, in which the Shah asked to personally convey his gratitude to Lord Salisbury. [3; 36] However, neither Wolff nor Talbot have ever shown their ties to official circles. On the contrary, they tried in every possible way to hide the involvement of the British government in this business.

The British tobacco monopoly was in the nature of a political plan directed against Russia. And Wolf was not even going to hide this fact. So, in a personal conversation with the French ambassador, de Ballua, Wolf spoke frankly about this. He was confident that his policy of concessions and large British financial investments in Iran would strengthen British influence and become a reliable obstacle to Russian penetration into the country.

As noted above, the tobacco concession was granted to Major Talbot on April 30, 1890. The Imperial Tobacco Corporation (Regia), as the organized enterprise came to be called, received a monopoly on the production, sale and export of tobacco for a period of 50 years. According to article 1, 15 thousand pounds sterling was to be received in the shah's treasury annually, regardless of the company's income, after deducting all expenses and distributions of 5% of profits between shareholders (article 3). According to Articles 2,5,6,8, all tobacco producers were required to register with the company's agents and, under the threat of prison and a fine, the transportation or unauthorized sale of tobacco was prohibited. The concessionaires were given the right to individually and arbitrarily set prices for tobacco. All the equipment of tobacco factories and equipment that had to be introduced to Iran was exempted from customs duties and other taxes (Article 4). Article 14 established that in case of disagreement, the parties turn to the arbitration court



of one of the representatives of the United States, Germany, Austria, who lived in Tehran. [4; 38-40]

The tobacco concession was very beneficial for the British. The annual consumption of tobacco in Iran was approximately 5.4 million kg, and it was exported 4 million kg. The company was counting on a net income of £ 372,000, i.e. 50% of the invested capital. [1; 164]

The tobacco monopoly, like no other, deeply hurt all, without exception, the population of the country. The peasants - producers of tobacco fell under the dependence of the British; artisans engaged in its processing; large merchants exporting Persian tobacco; medium and small merchants who buy tobacco from peasants; and, finally, all tobacco users are hookah and pipe smokers, who make up the entire adult population of the country. [5; 164]

According to Curzon, on September 30, 1889, tobacco occupied 5 places in the total value of Iranian exports in the amount of 7 442 thousand tumans (after opium, silk, rice and cotton), and its value was 350 thousand tumans. The tobacco trade, both internal and external, was in the hands of Iranian merchants and gave huge profits, reaching 200-300%. [6; 10]

Naturally, after the British obtained a certain monopoly, all the "cream" would go to them. The middle trading class of Iran did not want to lose its privilege and began to speak out both against foreigners and against the Shah.

As for the reaction from Russia, in September 1890 the new Russian envoy E.K.Byuttsov made an official protest against the notorious monopoly, but under the influence of Wolf, the Shah's government refused to cancel the concession. In February 1891, a group of influential Iranian officials, led by Amin al-Dole, a supporter of Russia, petitioned the shah from tobacco dealers to abolish the monopoly. They offered in return for the British company to pay the government the amount that it should have received under the concession contract. Russian protests and the petition of merchants somewhat shaken the Shah's conviction of the need for a monopoly, but Amin es-Soltane's determination was adamant. The resubmission of the petition by the tobacco traders prompted a harsh response from the Shah, who ordered that the rules of the tobacco monopoly be made public.

D. Wolf assured the Shah of England's active support. This position of England contributed to the fact that, despite the protests of Russia and the discontent of the population, the Shah and his prime minister supported the monopoly. [7; 256]

Meanwhile, after the conclusion of the concession agreement, the tobacco company developed its activities in Iran. The company's headquarters were located in Tehran. Its main

agencies were established in Shiraz, Isfahan, Mashhad and a number of other locations, each with its own staff, warehouses and factories.

By September 1891, the company had 266 employees. At the same time, it was assumed that when the creation of all other agencies was completed and factories began to operate, the number of personnel would be increased to 1806 people. The cost of tobacco, which was to be purchased in 1891, was determined at 335,900 pounds sterling, of which a third came from Azerbaijan (Urmia region), and the rest to Shiraz and Isfahan.

The company has taken steps to attract international capital in an effort to give itself greater political stability. For example, the French tobacco company Societe du tombac has agreed to purchase all Iranian tobacco for export. According to Kennedy, the director of the British tobacco company in Iran Ornstein hoped to subsequently interest the Russian government in the operations of this French company. [11; 143]

I would also like to note the fact that British officials in Tehran, carried away by the idea of a tobacco monopoly, from the very beginning underestimated the possibilities of the internal opposition, showing shortsightedness and arrogance. The revolt against the Shah and dissatisfaction with his rule turned into a real popular revolution, when the Shiite clergy joined him, which should be specially mentioned.

The entire 19th century was characterized by the opposition of the Shiite clergy to the Tehran rulers. The dynasty did not have the strong religious ties or control over religious circles that was characteristic of the Safavids, who gave Shiism the status of the state religion in Iran. The establishment of the main ulam in the Ottoman Empire (Najef) made spiritual leaders independent of the government and to some extent even increased their role in political life above the government. Mass discontent was immediately reflected in the ulema, whose representatives themselves were repeatedly dissatisfied with the policy of concessions to the infidels.

The Iranian clergy played a huge role in the social and political life of the state. Receiving revenues from waqf lands, the clergy occupied important both economic and political positions. The judiciary and public education were concentrated in his hands. All this determined his influence on believers. The authority of the Shiite clergy was especially great among small traders, artisans and villagers. [12; 17] Not a single more or less massive popular movement in Iran could do without the support of the clergy and the bazaar.

Naturally, the tremendous power and influence of the clergy displeased the Shah's



government, and a constant struggle was waged between them. From the point of view of Shiite dogma, absolute secular power is illegal, for it usurps what rightfully belongs only to the imam. The clergy have always opposed the excessive striving of the shah, his family and entourage for luxury, and by this they won the sympathy of Muslims who were close to the early Muslim ideals that preached simplicity and purity of morals. The struggle between the shah and the higher clergy became especially acute at the end of the 19th century. This was due to the fact that Nasr-ed-Din-Shah tried to partially limit the power of the clergy, carry out judicial reform and make some changes to the system of the state apparatus.

The second wave of discontent among the clergy and clerical opposition caused the penetration of European states into Iran. The Ulema were hostile to any foreign influence that undermined the foundations of Islam, fought against concessions and monopolies.

Assessing the Shiite clergy in the movement against the tobacco monopoly that began in Iran, the Iranian historian Kermani writes: "The clergy decided to take an active part in the movement when they learned about all the negative aspects of the monopoly. Today tobacco is limited, tomorrow - salt, then firewood, coal, water that for this the government will again receive large sums of money and will spend it not on the needs of the country, but will increase the salary of the shah-zada, or increase the salary of high officials, or spend on travel abroad, or pay the expenses of a pretty woman, while the country will incur losses, and foreigners will make a profit and their influence will increase." [13; 11]

Knowing the power of the clergy's influence and not doubting his decisive antipathy to the existing regime, the shah tried to suppress the imminent revolution by force, expelling from the country about 30 prominent leaders of the clergy - Sayyid Jamal al-Afghani, Mirza Reza Kermani, Haji Mirza Shirazi, etc. - to the situation and accelerated the development of events.

Subsequent reactions to the signing of the tobacco monopoly were expected, but not to the same extent. On this point, Lambton rightly notes that Sir Henry D. Wolfe, carried away by her idea, apparently neglected the hostility that such a concession could arouse among the merchants whose freedom of action it limited, and among the local users, not to mention the opposition that could be caused by religious fanaticism regarding such extraordinary consequences of a foreign enterprise. [8; 143]

Among the large and influential representatives of the national merchants, it is worth mentioning Hajj Mohammad Hasan Amin oz-Zabre. Certainly he initiated the organization of the boycott of the British company. As soon as the company

established a monopoly on tobacco and determined the period for selling tobacco to it until December 9, 1891, the outraged Iranian merchants took decisive action and turned to the local clergy for support. The head of the Shiite clergy, Haji Mirza Hasak Ashtiyani, met several times with Prime Minister Amin es-Soltane and with the Shah himself. But the result was the same status quo with respect to the British tobacco monopoly.

In response, the mullahs called for mass protests against the concession. The influential mujtahid, the abbot of the main mosque in Shiraz, Haji Mirza Hasan Shirazi, imposed a ban on tobacco smoking, and the shah's court was no exception. It was a fatwa that all Muslims must fulfill. In May, the protest movement spread to Tabriz, which was of particular importance in the economic, social and political life of Iran. It was the second largest city in Persia and was located at the junction of trade routes connecting Russia, Turkey, Afghanistan and all of Central Asia. There has long been a fairly strong Russian influence. Most of the population had relatives in the Russian possessions of the Caucasus, and the bulk of the trade was also in Russia. The production of tobacco products here was of paramount importance to the economy of the province, and the enormous influence of the ulema on the religious masses of Tabriz made the city a potentially potent point of serious unrest against the concession.

The anti-Rhegia movement spread throughout Iran. Hookahs and pipes disappeared not only from public places, they were not used in private houses, not excluding the Shah's palace. Tobacco traders in Shiraz, Isfahan, Mashhad destroyed tobacco supplies, which, according to the government's order, they were obliged to sell to an English company. Many planters destroyed tobacco seeds, deciding to stop growing it.

The Russian consul Petrov reported to Ambassador Byuttsov on August 3, 1891: "Excitement against the tobacco monopoly is growing. The authorities are powerless, the Europeans are in fear, because the local population is threatening to destroy the neighborhoods inhabited by them."

In such a tense atmosphere, the British hastened to carry out the "processing" of the Tabriz and other local merchants. To this end, a representative of the Imperial Ottoman Bank Evans hastily arrived in Tabriz, the center of the rebels, who tried to convince the merchants that the monopoly allegedly did not threaten their interests.

Talking to merchants, Evans decides to apply the infamous "carrot and stick" tactics. So he tells them that the English company is rich and that if they cooperate with it, they will only benefit, if not, then



let them blame themselves. Also, in his opinion, the merchants whom the English company will hire could continue their business, as before, only to pay the company the agreed 1 crane from each sold "eye" (3.5 kg). [5; 166]

Evans' calculation was quite simple: to split the ranks of the merchants and create the support of the British monopoly in the person recruited. However, the plans did not come true. One of the Tabriz mujtahids, Haji Mirza Yusuf, on August 12 spoke at the mosque against the English tobacco company, declaring, in particular: "The kafirs (infidels) have come here to invade our tobacco affairs, every Muslim who joins them, will also be a "kafir" and deserves death ... Since Nasr-ed-Din-shah sold us to the British, we should no longer recognize him as our padishah." [5; 166] The local clergy swore on the Koran to prevent the introduction of tobacco monopoly.

Upon learning of this, the British consul sends a panicky message to his embassy: "Haji Mirza Yusuf Agha Mujtahid preached vigorously against Regia for 12 of this month, arguing, among other things, that the kafirs came here to interfere in the tobacco business and any Muslim who will cooperate with them becomes kefir and deserves death.

The chief mujtahid telegraphed the Shah with the knowledge and approval of Amir-Nizami, informing him that the entire population of Azerbaijan is not satisfied with them in connection with Rhegia and if she is supported by the Shah, he will not be able to be responsible for order in the city, and is afraid of an uprising. There is also a rumor that if Regiya continues to act, he expects jihad, i.e. holy war." [3; 76] The Consul, also, with alarm reported the flow of letters from Tehran and the south of Persia, in which it was said that the population of these provinces was pinning their main hopes on the elimination of the tobacco monopoly with Azerbaijan.

Considering the great influence of Russia in this province, the shah went for a trick. He asked for assistance and "persuade the dissatisfied to calm down and not cause trouble, and even threatened them that Russia would not tolerate unrest in Azerbaijan's neighborhood." The cunning maneuver was well understood by Byuttsov, for the shah thereby wanted to prove to the Azerbaijanis that Russia is benevolent to the tobacco monopoly. Buttsov refused to do anything, and in turn advised the Shah to terminate the agreement with the British and make peace with his people, even if he had to go at significant financial costs. The ambassador was well informed about the state of affairs in Azerbaijan and the possible consequences and knew that the shah had no other choice. Popular anger grew more and more and soon spread to all provinces.

On August 19, in Tabriz in front of the heir's palace, a demonstration took place, the participants of which demanded the immediate abolition of the tobacco monopoly, otherwise threatening the defeat of the British consulate.

The decisive actions of the rebels forced the Shah to make concessions On August 30, 1891, in the city of Tabriz, the Shah received a telegram about the abolition of the tobacco monopoly in Azerbaijan. It was already, though not a big, but a victory.

The Shah was ready to concede and abolish the tobacco monopoly in other provinces of Persia in order to preserve his throne, but British diplomacy opposed this. On September 1, 1891, the Shah invites R. Kennedy, the acting ambassador of Great Britain, to the palace, where Amin es-Soltane paints a grim picture of the state of affairs in the country. Shah turned to the British envoy with a request to abolish the tobacco monopoly and offered to provide others, no less profitable, in exchange for it. [7; 257] Shah showed a countless number of telegrams, in which he was called a "traitor of the faith", a "dishonest merchant" who sold his country, and threatened the life of his heir. Kennedy advised not to give in to the crowd, for this is not a tobacco monopoly, but the power of the Shah himself, and if he backs down and fulfills the requirements, then the revolutionary spirit will spread to all of Iran. The Shah's concession would be tantamount to suicide. No foreign capitalist will then invest their money in Iranian enterprises, and the country will slide into decline. Kennedy advised Nasr al-Din Shah to announce through Amin es-Soltan in Tabriz that the concession would be canceled, but at the same time send a ciphered letter to the heir (Mozafar al-Din), the governor of Tabriz and the chief mujtahid, explaining that the concession would be will not be canceled. [3; 81]

Completely pleased with himself, Kennedy informs Salisbury of this conversation: "I pointed out to the Shah ... that it is not the tobacco concession, but the supreme power of His Majesty, is under attack and that if he let things take its course, the revolutionary spirit will quickly sweep all of Persia, for other provinces are looking at Azerbaijan as a signal center." [8; 135]

In his next message, the ambassador telegraphed to London that the trick was a success, and fermentation in Tabriz begins to decline. But that was a lie. Soon, London received another telegram with a completely different assessment of the situation: "I am afraid that this tobacco monopoly has done so much to arouse hostile feelings against the British, who until recently were considered by many, no doubt, as friends of Iran. Now, however, the masses suspect them of trying to introduce their customs and outbid the Persians on their side. " The ambassador also reported on a complete change in



the attitude of the Iranians towards the British and the use of the most disgusting epithets in relation to them. He accused the Shah and the Persian government of weakness and lack of determination to suppress the growing movement. "The Persian people have ceased to be afraid of the Shah," he concluded, "and if the Shah concedes, then his power in Azerbaijan will not be worth a penny." [3; 85]

It is thanks to the pressure of the British that the Shah continues to persist and play a double game with his own people. But this only exacerbated an already difficult situation. Just in case, the shah decided to probe the Russian soil. Meetings with Buttsov give the impression that the opinion has matured to annul Regia, but he is afraid that the British will demand to pay a rather large penalty, and there is no money in the treasury. The Russian ambassador immediately reported this to St. Petersburg, apparently hinting at the inevitable costs in the event of the termination of the Anglo-Iranian treaty.

On the one hand, the Shah sought from the British a response to their actions in his defense and support, and on the other hand, he "humbly asked" Russia to take him under her protection. Kennedy informed Lord Salisbury on September 4 of the request of the Shah and Amin es-Soltana for advice as to if all peaceful means fail, whether the concession should be maintained by force, or if it should be canceled, whether compensation could be made in the form of other concessions or monetary compensation. by installments.

In other words, the shah wanted to make the British responsible for his further actions, and at the same time tame them to the idea of monetary expenses in case of termination of the concession. But Lord Salisbury was an excellent politician and it was impossible to cheat him so easily. He understood the tactics of Nasr al-Din Shah and made it clear that he must extricate himself from the situation on his own, although he advised him to find "something" that would be softer than liquidation, since, in his opinion, such a clear retreat could prompt a general attack on foreigners. Could it be possible to find some justification for temporarily postponing her work for the present time in most of the agitated areas, "he asked Kennedy. [3; 86]

In the opinion of the British ambassador, such an answer completely satisfied the Shah, but he personally spoke out frankly that the prospects for Rhexia were bleak and rather large expenses would have to be incurred before the people of northern Persia came to terms with her. The Shah followed the advice of Lord Salisbury and ordered the ruler of Azerbaijan by any means to achieve the approval of the tobacco monopoly. If it was impossible to fulfill this order, the Shah proposed to temporarily

"postpone" the start of its work, but at the same time gave an order to prohibit the import of tobacco into Azerbaijan from other regions of Persia. According to the Shah, this will lead to high costs for traders, bring them to their senses and reconcile with the need for the tobacco monopoly and cooperation with it on favorable terms.

But Kennedy had completely different information. The fact is that a kind of tradition has developed in Iran, when the Russian embassy threw the necessary information into the British through the French embassy, and that, in turn, transmitted back its own, which demonstrated to the Russian diplomats all the insidiousness of the Shah's game. Thus, both embassies were well aware of the real actions of the shah, although in a number of cases the shah managed to fool them with the help of disinformation. At the moment, the French ambassador de Ballois was the mediator. According to the information he passed on to Kennedy, Nasr-ed-Din-Shah wrote a personal letter to the Russian emperor asking him to take pity on him, take him under his protection and help him extricate himself from the vicious situation into which the British "dragged" him.

It is still unknown whether this letter is fiction or not. Many historians believe that this is most likely an invention of Amin es-Soltane in order to force the British to be compliant. De Ballois soon gave Kennedy another piece of news. According to his information, apparently received from Byuttsov, the Russian ambassador had instructions in which there was an insistent demand for the annulment of the tobacco monopoly. Information from another source said that the shah was afraid of large compensation and, allegedly, told Byuttsov about the threat of occupation by the British as compensation for Bushehr, to which Byuttsov said that in this case the Russians would occupy Mashhad and the territory adjacent to Afghanistan. The Shah, the informant said, hearing this tone, "almost decided to eliminate Regia," while events unfolded at an alarming rate. [3; 86]

Many tobacco merchants in Mashhad, Tabriz and other cities took refuge in mosques with local residents, and the crowd gathered in the streets sent threats to the "infidels" declaring their determination to defend their religion. The shops of merchants were closed, students of the madrasah rebelled. Neither the repressions of the governor of Khorasan Saheb Divan, nor the Shah's firman on punishment for disobedience helped. This is how the events unfolded in Mashhad, in the third paragraph - after Isfahan and Tabriz - for the cancellation of the activities of the English tobacco company. As a result, the Shah on October 6 sent a telegram to Saheb Divan, in which he demanded to disperse the merchants who had



settled in the mosque, giving the following instructions that "if they do not immediately get down to their business and stop their foolishness, you must gather all the cavalry and infantry of Khorsan ... to Mashhad, arrest all rebels without exception and shoot 100 of them and curse their fathers." [1; 181]

The situation in the capital, Tehran, also became more and more aggravated. Here the population turned to civil disobedience. A letter came from Samarra to Tehran - a fatwa from Haji Mirza Hasan Shirazi, who announced a ban on tobacco smoking by the population until the concession was canceled. In the tense situation, the Shah and Amin es-Soltane decided to take tough measures against the most active traders. Haji Mohammad Kazem Malik from Tajir was expelled from Tehran under guard. However, these measures have led nowhere.

In early December 1892, proclamations were posted in the bazaars of Tehran, stating that if the employees of the tobacco company did not leave the country by Monday (December 16), then a holy war would be declared on them. [8; 150]

The Shah, powerless to do anything, left the capital, leaving Amin es-Soltane to extricate himself from the situation. The latter convened a council of state, chaired by Prince Naib es-Soltane. The meeting was attended by ministers and Tehran mujtahids. Some of them accused the government of conniving at foreigners. After a rather lengthy debate at the Council of State, it was announced that the word "monopoly" would be removed from the tobacco concession. This ambiguity of the wording gave the right to interpret it in different ways. The Mujtahids meant by this the complete liquidation of the English concession. Guided by this decision, Amin es-Soltane began negotiations with the British company. He proposed to the director J. Ornstein to abandon the monopoly of tobacco trade within the country, keeping it in foreign trade. As compensation, the government pledged to pay 500 thousand tumans within 50 years, for which a duty of 20% of the cost had to be levied on the sale of tobacco. This decision suited the Shah very much, for it freed him from the need to pay a large sum of money to the company at a time and made it possible to announce the liquidation of the monopoly to calm the merchants and clergy. On December 10, 1891, the corresponding shah's firman was published in this regard.

Only now did the British government realize that the monopoly could not be saved. On December 15, Salisbury telegraphed: "The demands formed by the company, if we are correctly informed, seem completely excessive. Remember, the first thing we have to take care of is maintaining the position of Amin es-Soltane. We should not support claims that would carry the risk of discrediting any of them. "

Speaking of the Persian state, Lord Salisbury had in mind one shah, since he had repeatedly warned British diplomats that the main thing in this game was to keep the Shah and Amin es-Soltan as the conductors of British interests.

Lord Salisbury was right about the amount of compensation. She really was astronomical. The British Embassy did not support this demand, and the situation continued to be alarming. In January, she became already threatening. In Tehran on January 6, 1892, it came to an open clash between the people and the guards of the Shah's palace. These events began with a letter from the Shah to Haji Mirza Hasan Shirazi, one of the initiators of the fatwa, with an ultimatum: either start smoking and thereby set an example for the others, or leave Tehran. Ashtiyani chose the latter and began to prepare for departure. This news quickly spread throughout the city. Crowds of people began to gather near the house of the mujtahid and near the shah's palace. The crowd smashed all the outer windows of the palace and nearly showered Prince Naib es-Soltane who had come out to them. The troops opened fire: 7 people were killed and 30 wounded. But the Cossack brigade, to which the shah and the prince turned for help, refused to disperse the crowd and did not obey the order of the shah. Apparently, this played a decisive role in subsequent events, since the Cossack brigade under the command of Colonel Kosogovsky was the Shah's only support in case of serious unrest.

In these difficult days, only the support of Russia saved the Shah from the inevitable removal from the throne. Buttsov was instructed to tell the Shah that he can count on Russia's complete "disinterestedness" and readiness to maintain his possession intact in accordance with the historical traditions of relations between the two countries, if he "for his part returns to his old policy of sincere trust in Russia." ... The Shah soon received the Russian ambassador and said that "from now on, his policy will change, and promised to treat Russia with sincere trust."

In this situation, the Russian government adhered to its main task - to weaken the British influence in Iran as much as possible. All means have been used to achieve this.

On January 12, the Shah announced the final abolition of the tobacco monopoly. Religious leaders demanded written confirmation that the concession was completely liquidated and would never be renewed. Only after Amin el-Soltane managed to convince the main Tehran mujtahid Ashtiyani that there would be no return to the concession, the city's herald on January 26, 1892 announced the end of the smoking ban. By mid-February, the movement began to decline. With the resumption of tobacco smoking everywhere, the anti-Regia movement ended.



The abolition of the tobacco monopoly was also influenced by the fact that in November 1892 there were changes in the British mission in Tehran. In the fall, a new British envoy arrived, F. Laskell, who quickly understood the situation and decided that the best way out for England in these conditions was to retreat as soon as possible and liquidate the tobacco monopoly. And he tried to make her liquidation less painful for England. It was under pressure from the new British ambassador, the director of the tobacco company, Ornstein, following the Shah, signed the mentioned statement on the abolition of Regia.

What were the results of the popular movement for the future of Iran? They completely changed the balance of political forces in the country, contributed to the creation of a practically organized opposition to the Shah's regime, headed by religious leaders. The country got out of the Qajars' control, autonomous movements emerged sharply, Muslim leaders began to play a noticeable role in the leadership of the regions, and the Shah and his court were practically without any social or political base. A political vacuum formed around them, which weakened the central government. This was the beginning of the end of the Qajar dynasty.

The monopoly was abolished, however, the issue of payment of compensation for its termination remained unresolved. The director of the company, Ornstein, demanded to pay more than £ 600,000, explaining that most of it went to buy out the concession from Talbot and to bribe Iranian officials and courtiers. The Iranian government offered to be content with the sum of 300 thousand pounds sterling, since it had information that the initial amount was clearly overstated. As a result of long disputes, a compromise was reached, and the final amount was 500 thousand pounds, of which 350 thousand were to go as compensation for production costs, and 150 thousand - for the purchase of tobacco and inventory from her. The contribution was to be made as soon as an agreement was reached.

Now a new question arose before the Persian government: where to get the money to pay such a huge amount? Attempts to obtain a loan in France were unsuccessful. Then the Shah's government decided to apply to the Shahinshah Bank with a request for a loan of 500 thousand pounds sterling, with a maturity of 20 years at the rate of 5 or 6% per annum. The bank manager in Tehran, Rabino, telegraphed this to London on March 15, 1892. He was advised to accept the request, but to put forward a response demand that customs in the Persian Gulf would serve as a guarantee, and also to force a new road concession. The terms of the loan were very difficult, and the Shah's government continued to seek external loans.

At the next round of negotiations, Amin el-Soltane said that if the Shahinshah Bank did not abandon its original 8% condition, the Iranian government would be forced to borrow from Russia. However, the Iranians refused the Russian loan only after the representatives of the Shahinshah Bank agreed to provide a loan at the rate of 6% per annum.

Initially, the bank demanded £ 700,000, of which the government would pay £ 500,000 to the tobacco monopoly, and 200,000 would have to be spent on the construction of the Shuster highway. The loan term was set for 40 years at the rate of 8% per annum and 8% commission with a guarantee from income from southern customs, telegraph and others. On the advice of Buttsov, the Shah's government rejected these conditions, agreeing to take only the necessary £ 500,000. at 6% per annum for a period of 40 years with a guarantee of income from the southern ports, but without control over them.

Finally, on September 12, 1892, an agreement was signed in London between the Shahinshah Bank, on the one hand, and the tobacco company, on the other, on the payment of remuneration. In the final version, the tobacco company received 250 thousand pounds sterling, but in Iranian barats and 50 thousand went to the bank as a commission. All the property of the monopoly henceforth passed to the disposal of the Shah's government. The tobacco monopoly case was over.

CONCLUSION

Summing up the consideration of the issue of the activities of British diplomacy in Iran at the end of the XIX century. note that it was the failure of the tobacco monopoly that showed all its vices and weaknesses. Here in Iran, Henry D. Wolf clearly overestimated the diplomatic capabilities of Great Britain, whose interests he represented. The "Master of Eastern Diplomacy" failed the entire carefully conceived venture of the Foreign Office and lost the most important battle in Iran. And the consequences of this defeat were rather grim for British diplomacy. She had to work hard after that to restore her position.

REFERENCES

1. Seidov R.A. *The Iranian bourgeoisie in the late XIX - early XX century. (the initial stage of formation)*. – Moscow, Nayka, 1974, 245 p. [in Russian].
2. Ibragimov T.A. *Иранда сўжаси чэмийэтлар вэ тэшиклатларын жарамасы вэ онларын фэами јјэти (1858-1906)*. - Бакы, 1967, – 327 p.
3. Keddy N. *Religion and Rebellion in Iran. The tobacco-protest of 1891-1892*. – London. 1966, 351 p.



4. *Теймури И. Герардад-сал-е 1891 "Режу". – Техран, 1963, 121 с.*
5. *Stroeva L.K. The struggle of the Iranian people against the British tobacco monopoly in Iran in 1891 - 1892. // Problems of the history of the national liberation movement in Asian countries. - Leningrad, Izdatelstvo LSY, 1963, 184 с. [in Russian].*
6. *Tomara M.L. The economic situation of Persia. - SP., 1895, 205 с. [in Russian].*
7. *Kazemzaden F. Russia and Britain in Persia. 1864-1914. New Haven – London, 1968, – 398 p.*
8. *Lambton J.K.S. The Tobacco Pegie: Prelude to Revolution. // Studia Islamica. n XXII. – Paris: Le 30 Septembre, 1965, 223 p.*
9. *Doroshenko E.A. The Shiite clergy in the modern world. – Moscow, Nayka, 1975, 171 с. [in Russian].*
10. *Назем оль-Эслам Кермани. Тарих-е бизару-йе ираниан. - // Farsi translation - Moscow. 1953, 191 с. [in Russian].*