



A STRATEGY THAT WORKS: DE-INDOCTRINATION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Terrorist attacks by Boko Haram have continued to fester over the years despite efforts by the government and security agencies to control it. This has necessitated employing de-indoctrination as a framework that could effectively (re)direct policy and action. Using descriptive approach, data were secondarily sourced and analyzed to present detailed figures of records and casualties of attacks by Boko Haram over the years. Following descriptive statistics, data were presented in charts and tables with detailed descriptions. We found that Boko Haram terrorists enjoy significant level of sympathy from some Northern citizens due to indoctrination. This shows that indoctrination remains the most effective tool breeding the growth of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. We therefore advocate the adoption of de-indoctrination as a framework that involves conscious efforts aimed at reexamining the type of education available to youths and children in the Northern Nigeria. We also call for the alamjiri system of education to be redesigned in such a way that there is no room for indoctrination.

KEYWORDS: *Boko Haram, De-indoctrination, Framework, Indoctrination, Terrorism.*

INTRODUCTION

A specter that undermines social progress is threatening Africa. This specter is Boko Haram terrorism (Ajah, Ajah & Obasi, 2020; Nnam, Ajah, Arua, Okechukwu & Okorie, 2019; Ajah, 2019; Nweke & Ajah, 2017). Though terrorism is not new and has always existed at one or more places per time. It usually starts small and grows big, then overwhelms instituted authorities. In some cases however, it starts small, grows big and turns into a protracted battle between instituted authorities and terrorist groups. This can be seen in Yemen and Syria. Every form of terror begins with a discontented party, a party aggrieved by the existing order. Once this party resorts to the use of

violence to gain control or resolve disagreements, terror usually results. Bruce (2006) in Ajah (2018a) noted that terror includes all forms of violence or threat of violence that is used and directed in service of political aims. Every act of terror is peddled on a common goal – to accede power to the terrorists either momentarily or permanently.

It is impossible to perpetrate any act of terror without employing violence or threat of use of violence (Nnam, Ajah, Arua, Okechukwu & Okorie, 2019; Ajah & Onyejebu, 2019). Such violence usually amounts to crime. Egbegi, Ajah and Ogbonnaya (2018) defined terrorism as all criminal acts against civilian populations or bodies of authorities that are intended to



intimidate the population or make the authorities to do or abstain from doing an act. Clearly, terrorism does not only harm authorities, regular citizens are often affected or murdered in the process of terrorists exerting their influence through violence (Ajah, 2018b). These acts are usually unlawful and against the constitutions of existing authorities. The Legal Information Institute (1992) corroboratively defined terrorism as "unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives". Terror is, above all, unlawful. In all cases, terrorism breaks major parts of the constitution of its parent society.

Though, a lot of research efforts have been directed towards terrorism (Egbegi, Ajah & Ogbonnaya, 2018; Popoola, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013; Ekwueme & Akpan, 2011) and its impacts in Nigeria. These have been spearheaded by scholars, students, government officials, non-governmental organizations and other bodies with interests in social order. So little has however been achieved in understanding how indoctrination has fertilized the growth of boko-haram terrorism. This paper intends to fill this gap and additionally recommend ways terrorism could be addressed in Nigeria and Africa. Specifically, this paper studies the genealogy of boko-haram terror crimes in Nigeria and innovative ways to bring terrorism to an end.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BOKO-HARAM IN NIGERIA

Boko-haram, according to Popoola (2012), is a militant Islamic sect based in Northern Nigeria and was formed around 2002. Egbegi, Ajah and Ogbonnaya (2018) maintained that the militant group saw society, particularly the government of Mala Kachalla as irredeemably corrupt. Boko-haram includes members who came from neighboring Chad and Niger, who speak Arabic. The sect was able to attract more than 280,000 members across northern Nigeria and from Chad and Niger (Uwar 2011; Agbiboa, 2013). Agbiboa (2013) observed that Boko-haram's membership comprises university lecturers, bankers, political elites, drug addicts, unemployed graduates, almajiris, and migrants from neighboring countries. Members are drawn primarily from the Kanuri tribe, which makes up roughly 4 percent of the Nigerian population, and is concentrated in the northeastern states of Nigeria, including Bauchi and Borno, as well as from the Hausa-Fulani which constitutes 29 percent of their population, who are spread throughout most of the Northern States.

Guided by the meaning of the name "Boko-haram" which is translated as "western education is sinful", some people view their mission as reformist in nature. In 2004, after the group moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, they set up a base called 'Afghanistan' from where it attacked nearby police stations and killed police officers (Popoola, 2012). For strategic operational reasons, Mohammed Yusuf extended the operations of the group to Maiduguri, Borno State in 2009, where they attacked and killed several political and religious leaders or their families, especially, those who had openly condemned or criticized their activities. From that moment, the group stepped up its operations and by 2011 several government officials as well as security operatives were killed (Ajah, Dinne & Kabiru, 2020; Egbegi, Ajah & Ogbonnaya, 2018; Popoola, 2012).

In 2011, the group struck other targets in the north including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, where they bombed the police headquarters and the United Nation's office. On November 4th, 2011, the group attacked Damaturu and Potiskum, in Yobe State respectively, which claimed the life of 65 people (Ajah, Dinne & Kabiru, 2020; Egbegi, Ajah & Ogbonnaya, 2018; Popoola, 2012). The devastating effect of the group's attack has thus forced several governmental ministries, parastatals, and corporate establishments, non-governmental organisations to step up security measures in an attempt to protect lives and property (Ajah, Dinne & Kabiru, 2020; Egbegi, Ajah & Ogbonnaya, 2018; Popoola, 2012).

Ekwueme, (2011) observed that Boko-haram is fast becoming Nigeria's version of Muslim extremists operating with impunity elsewhere, maiming and killing those they consider as infidels. In addition to the above assertion, Ekwueme further argued that the group's teachings resemble that of the Afghanistan Taliban. They believe that any teaching or education that does not conform to the tenets of Islam is sinful and should not be taught at all. They also believed that it was the influence of western education that is watering down Islamic teaching and weakening Islam itself.

Furthermore, Ekwueme and Akpan (2011) observed that the group exploited the country's dysfunctional school system that is plagued with numerous strikes by teachers, widespread youth unemployment, poverty and a high prevalence of illiteracy to lure and recruit its members. The group also exploits the absence of an effective security system in the country to carry out their gruesome activities. Taking advantage of these economic frustrations and corrupt leadership of the country, they were able to win many converts. Even highly educated and well-connected members of the



society joined the sect, and because their teaching addressed the frustrations of the unemployed youths, some of them dropped out of school, left their homes and joined the group fully (Ajah & Ugwuoke, 2018; Ekwueme & Akpan, 2011).

The Guardian Newspaper (2011) expressed a similar view when it observed that Boko-haram is largely populated by young and often educated unemployed followers who are restless and disenchanting with a life of idleness and hopelessness. They are therefore, a ready and willing audience for a preacher who, pooh-poohing western education as valueless in this life and in the life to come, calls on his followers to reject it.

Boko Haram as a Terrorist Group

In many ways, the foundation of Boko Haram rests on the Islamic history of northern Nigeria. For some 800 years, a powerful leadership structure of Muslim sultanates dominated northern Nigeria and defined how civilizations fared in the region. With the tools of Islamic religion and political legitimacy, these sultanates controlled the minds and laws of people in the northern region. From 1802 – 1812, the sultanates were challenged by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio with a Jihadist campaign aimed at creating an Islamic caliphate that covers northern Nigeria and stretches into neighboring countries. This campaign was successful and the caliphate was still ruled by descendants of Dan Fodio when they were conquered by the British in 1905 – and the north was federated with south to form the nation, Nigeria. Boko Haram fights to recreate the lost Dan Fodio's caliphate in northern Nigeria with territories from neighboring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

Boko Haram movement was started by Muhammad Yusuf in 2002. Yusuf was a member of a more conservative Moslem organization called Izala Society (Mohd, 2017). Izala Society was friendly with the government and did not promote strict Islamic laws like Sharia Law. Yusuf used this platform to raise sympathizers and recruit followers – and then broke out to form his own group, Boko Haram. The new group started by isolating themselves from the society and lived away from local communities in remote forests. The first 7 years of their operation was not so violent until in 2011 when the group bombed major markets, killed civilians and police officers, and bombed United Nations' office in Nigeria's capital, Abuja. In all attacks, they opposed western education and called for the islamization of Nigeria. By the end of 2012, Boko Haram had successfully carved-out an Islamic caliphate in Borno State in Nigeria with territories cutting across Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

Boko Haram checks all three definitive conditions of terrorism and has long been labeled a terrorist organization by Nigeria and the international community.

How Nigeria has tackled Boko Haram Till Date

Efforts have also been made by Nigerians and government agencies to address the killings by boko-haram terrorists and these efforts have been impactful in some areas.

After Attack Arrests: Security agencies have occasionally conducted arrests of boko-haram kingpins associated with killings. For instance, Kabiru Sokoto, a notorious boko-haram terrorist was arrested by the police. Kabiru Sokoto was reported to have been a key suspect in the Christmas Day bombing which killed more than 40 people in Nigeria (Egbegi, Ajah & Ogbonnaya, 2018). On 14 May 2014, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche was arrested on suspicion of helping to mastermind a string of atrocities on behalf of the Boko-haram terrorist group (Soni, 2018). From the conduct of the few random arrests made, it is unclear whether there is a laid-down security strategy or not. What is apparent is that the arrests were not consistent even as the boko-haram attacks persist. This could be due to lack of political will or lack of concrete strategy on how to approach the threat.

Former President Goodluck Jonathan has been able to capture vividly Government's response to the threat posed by the boko-haram terrorist group on the country (Nweke & Ajah, 2017). In his response to former President Olusegun Obasanjo's letter to him on the state of the nation titled, "Before it is too late" (2013), President Jonathan averred:

...At a stage, almost the entire North-East of Nigeria was under siege by insurgents. Bombings of churches and public buildings in the North and the federal capital became an almost weekly occurrence. Our entire national security apparatus seemed nonplussed and unable to come to grips with the new threat posed by the berthing of terrorism on our shores, but my administration has since brought that unacceptable situation under significant control. We have overhauled our entire national security architecture, improved intelligence gathering, training, funding, logistical support to our armed forces and security collaboration with friendly countries with very visible and positive results (Jonathan, 2013).

Other measures deduced from the President's letter include poverty alleviation programmes, economic development, education and social reforms. The details are the provision of modern basic education



schools for the Almajiri and the establishment of nine new federal universities in several Northern states (Ajah, 2019; Akpan, Ekanem & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014). The government is also aggressively addressing the challenges of poverty through its youth empowerment programmes such as N-Power, and investing massively in infrastructure to promote economic development. At the height of the insurgency, Government set up an administrative panel to discuss with the insurgents, but they bluntly refused to meet with the government team. The sum of the administrative framework within much of the anti-insurgency policy, which has been implemented, especially within the context of Boko Haram are as follows:

- Troops have been reinforced
- The leadership of the movement has been targeted
 - The International Joint Task Force (JTF) has been put in place
 - The army has taken over the provision of internal security (declaration of state of emergency)
 - A Curfew has been imposed
 - GSM services have been banned and restored
 - Civilian JTFs have been established
 - Road blocks have been set up, and many other measures which the security operatives have put in place

These approaches by the government are flawed considering the danger of indoctrination that uses political, religion and ethnic sentiments to sow seeds of discord, thereby providing the fertilized ground for terrorism to thrive in Nigeria.

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

The iceberg epidemiological model formed the theoretical standpoint of this paper. Epidemiological models focus on the distribution and determinants of infectious diseases, the source and spread of communicable and non-communicable diseases and social phenomena like crime, road injuries and the buying and spread of hate content via the internet (Ajah & Nweke, 2017; Eteng, Echiegu, Eteng, Okereke, Otu & Nweke, 2007; Stein & Richter, 2012). The epidemiological model can be used to better understand, predict and prevent the spread of terrorist indoctrination ideologies while proffering de-indoctrination as cure to the malaise. The iceberg epidemiological model of disease holds that for every hospitalized patient suffering severe disease symptoms, thousands more 'walking sick' exist with subclinical disease who should be targeted for intervention and many more are at risk due to background effects or exposures (Richter, 2017).

Applied to terrorism, the Iceberg model expresses the concept that perpetrators are drawn from a larger

population-wide pool of increasing degrees of risk and participation as sympathizers, endorsers, followers, recruits, and ultimately participants or perpetrators. For example, supporters of an ideology that glorifies acts of terror may themselves be passive. However, with repeated stimuli, these supporters can become active participants. Intervention or deterrence directed at removing or neutralizing the actions of those at the top of the iceberg by itself cannot be expected to remove the source of the influence directed at the entire population. It is futile to simply hunt for terrorists when radical ideologies inculcated through indoctrination prevail in entire populations. Prevention or eradication of terrorism requires more than tactical defeats or punitive measures against the perpetrators of violence. Population-wide counter-strategies must be implemented. Indeed, the iceberg epidemiological model recognizes de-indoctrination as the strategy that must be implemented to ensure that the endless spread of terrorist ideologies is countered and defeated.

METHODOLOGY

The research design employed for this study was descriptive in nature. Data were principally sourced through the review and content analysis of cases documented and compiled by Nigeria Watch Project (Nigeria Watch monitors lethal violence, conflicts, and human security in Nigeria. It began in July 2006 and is hosted by the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA-Nigeria) on the campus of University of Ibadan since July 2013. Nigeria Watch was supported by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and NSRP (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme) in 2013-2017. It is also supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the British Council's Managing Conflict in North East Nigeria (MCN) Programme, the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta, the Institute de recherche pour le developpement (IRD) and others).

The utilisation of this method was deemed appropriate and suitable for a study of this nature because Boko haram attacks in Nigeria have become prevalent and incessant. Moreover, Nigeria Watch is the only database in Nigeria that documents and compiles day-to-day attacks of Boko haram across Nigeria and has an updated data on any issue relating to lethal violence, conflicts and human security. Due to sensitivity of the topic under discussion, the Nigeria Army or Police will hesitate and will be unwilling to release any document as regards attacks by Boko haram in Nigeria hence the choice for Nigeria Watch. In addition, the choice of Nigeria Watch database for this article is also because of high level of accuracy and reliability especially as it




concerns documenting and compiling daily occurrences of Boko haram and other lethal violence in Nigeria. More importantly, the rationale behind the selection of the 2015-2020 timeline was because of the high prevalence of Boko haram attack within this period. Moreover, amidst the claim by the Nigeria government and the Nigeria Army that the Boko haram has been “technically defeated” It is vital to note that the Buhari led administration in 2015 opined that the Boko haram has been technically defeated, despite this claim, the Boko haram insurgent are hitting the North East states so hard, with so many casualties on the side of the Nigeria Army and civilians especially in North east Nigeria. The Nigeria Watch database was used especially as it concerns Boko haram attacks from 2015-Q1 2020, the data were carefully sorted, organised, and arranged according to yearly occurrence (2015-Q1 2020), state of occurrence, number of

mortality across the years under review, number of mortality across the states affected amongst others. The data were analysed using descriptive statistics which includes line graph (which was used to examine the yearly trend of Boko haram attacks from 2015-Q1 2020), charts, frequency distributions were employed to analyse the mortality rates and state of attacks across Nigeria within the period under review.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A total of 1186 Boko haram attacks occurred across Nigerian states between 2015 and Q1 2020 with a total mortality of 23,455 within the period under review. Accordingly, this section presents and discusses trends of Boko haram attacks in Nigeria within the period under review.

Figure 1: A line graph showing the trend of Boko haram attacks in Nigeria from 2015- Q1 2020.



Source: Nigerian Watch Project (2020).


Q1= First Quarter Year 2020.

Figure 1 above showcases the trend of book haram attacks in Nigeria from 2015 to first quarter of 2020. The analysis of the yearly trend of Boko haram attacks in Nigeria was carried out to show the enormity and tendencies of the attacks across Nigeria within 2015 and Q1 2020. The trend shows that 2015 had the highest number of attacks in Nigeria (28.2%), in year

2016, the rate of Boko haram attack sloped to 18.1% and went a bit higher again in 2017 to 18.7%, in 2018, the trend sloped down to 14.4% and surged in 2019 to 15.4%. The first quarter of 2020 shows 5.2% of Boko haram attack, this is quiet high because we are just in first quarter of 2020.



Figure 2: A bar chart showcasing percentage distribution of mortality resulting from Boko haram attacks from 2015-Q1 2020




Source: Nigerian Watch Project (2020).

Q1= First Quarter Year 2020.

Figure 2 above is a bar chart showcasing percentage distribution of number of mortality resulting from Boko haram attacks from 2015-Q1 2020. The result shows that more mortality occurred in 2015 (44.8%) as a result of Boko haram attacks in Nigeria, 16.5% of the deaths occurred in 2016, in 2017, the mortality rate reduced to 12.6% and further reduced to 9.2% in year

2018. The mortality rate caused by Boko haram attacks went up to 12.3% in 2019. The first quart of 2020 shows the mortality rate triggered by Boko haram attacks is 4.5%. This implies that year 2015 had higher percentage of the mortality rate caused by Boko haram attacks.

Figure 3: A bar chart showcasing the actual number of mortality resulting from Boko haram attacks from 2015-Q1 2020 in Nigeria



Source: Nigerian Watch Project (2020).

Q1= First Quarter Year 2020.



Figure 3 above presents the actual number of mortality resulting from Boko haram attacks from 2015-Q1 2020 in Nigeria. A total number of 23, 455 deaths occurred due to Boko haram attacks across Nigeria from 2015-Q1 2020. The result shows that a total of 10507 deaths occurred in 2015 as a result of Boko haram attacks in Nigeria. In 2016, a total of 3875 deaths occurred due to Boko haram attacks across Nigeria. In 2017, the death

rate reduced to 2964 across Nigeria due to Boko haram attacks. In 2018, the death rates caused by Boko haram attacks reduced further to 2152, unfortunately, in 2019, the death rate caused by Boko haram attacks increased from 2152 in 2018 to 2869 in 2019. Only the first quarter of 2020 have witnessed a total of 1088 deaths which includes Civilians and the Nigeria Army.

Table 1: Distribution of number of Boko haram Attacks across states in Nigeria from 2015-Q1 2020

States	Number of attacks	Percentage
Adamawa	84	7%
Bauchi	1	0.08%
Borno	989	83.4%
Ekiti	1	0.08%
Enugu	1	0.08%
FCT (Abuja)	3	0.3%
Gombe	9	0.8%
Kaduna	4	0.3%
Kano	9	0.8%
Kogi	2	0.2%
Niger	2	0.2%
Ondo	1	0.08%
Plateau	5	0.4%
Yobe	75	6.3%
Total	1186	100%

Source: Nigerian Watch Project (2020).

Q1= First Quarter Year 2020.

Table 1 showcases the number of Boko haram attacks that occurred in Nigeria between 2015-Q1 2020 across states in Nigeria, the result shows that 7% of the Boko haram attacks occurred in Adamawa state, 0.08% of the attacks occurred in Bauchi state, 83.4% of the attacks occurred in Borno state, 0.08% of the attacks took place in Ekiti state, another 0.08% of the attacks occurred in Enugu state, 0.3% attacks occurred in FCT (Abuja), 0.8% of the attacks occurred in Gombe state, 0.3% of the Boko haram attacks happened in Kaduna

states, 0.8% of the Boko haram attacks occurred in Kano state, 0.2% of the Boko haram attacks occurred in Kogi state another 0.2% of the Boko haram attacks occurred in Niger state, 0.08 of the Boko haram attacks between 2015-Q1 2020 took place in Ondo state, 0.4% of the Boko haram attacks took place in Plateau state while 6.3% of the Boko haram attacks took place in Yobe state. This implies that majority (83.4%) of the Boko haram attacks that took place in Nigeria between 2015-Q1 2020 occurred in Borno state.

Table 2: Percentage of distribution of mortality caused by Boko haram attacks across the states in Nigeria from 2015-Q1 2020

States	Number of deaths	Percentage
Adamawa	1,340	5.7%
Bauchi	1	0.004%
Borno	20,360	86.8%
Ekiti	1	0.004%
Enugu	1	0.004%
FCT (Abuja)	19	0.08%
Gombe	98	0.4%
Kaduna	296	1.3%
Kano	73	0.3%
Kogi	16	0.07%



Niger	23	0.1%
Ondo	2	0.009%
Plateau	86	0.4%
Yobe	1,139	4.8%
Total	23455	100%


Source: Nigerian Watch Project (2020).

Q1= First Quarter Year 2020.

Table 2 above presents distribution of mortality caused by Boko haram attacks across the states in Nigeria from 2015-Q1 2020. It is evident from the above that Borno state has the highest percentage (86.8%) of mortality within the period under review, followed by Adamawa state with (5.7%) of the total number of deaths within the period under review, followed by Yobe state with (4.8%) of the total mortality within the period under review. Kaduna state had a 1.3% of the total deaths that occurred within 2015-Q1 2020, Gombe state and Plateau had 0.4% respectively. Kano state had 0.3% of the mortality caused by Boko haram attacks from 2015-

Q1 2020, Niger state had a total of 0.1% deaths caused by Boko haram attacks, 0.08% of the mortality took place in FCT (Abuja) within the period under review, 0.07% of the mortality happened in Kogi state, 0.009% of the mortality happened in Ondo state. Bauchi state, Ekiti state and Enugu state all had 0.004% of the mortality respectively in their states. From the table it becomes obvious that most of the mortalities caused by Boko haram attacks within the period under review occurred in North east Nigeria were the Boko haram attacks is prevalent and incessant.

Figure 4: A bar chart showcasing percentage distribution of mortalities caused by Boko haram attacks in 1st Quarter 2020 in Nigeria



Source: Nigerian Watch Project (2020).


Q1= First Quarter Year 2020.

Figure 4 above is a bar chart showcasing percentage distribution of mortalities caused by Boko haram attacks in 1st quarter 2020 in Nigeria. The result shows that 29.2% of the mortality occurred in January, 40.5% of the mortality as caused by Boko haram attacks in Nigeria Q1 2020 occurred in February, while 30.3% of

the Boko haram attacks that occurred in Q1 2020 took place in the month of march, this is an indication that higher percentage (40.5%) of the Boko haram mortalities in Q1 2020 occurred in February 2020.



Figure 5: A bar chart showcasing actual number of mortalities caused by Boko haram attacks in 1st Quarter 2020 in Nigeria



Source: Nigerian Watch Project (2020).

Figure 5 above displays the actual number of mortalities caused by Boko haram attacks in Q1 2020. The result shows that a total of 318 mortalities occurred in January 2020 due to Boko haram attacks across Nigeria, it increased in February 2020 to 441 mortality due to Boko haram attacks, in March 2020, a total of 329 mortalities occurred in Nigeria due to Boko haram attacks across Nigeria. This implies that highest number of mortality in Q1 2020 took place in February 2020.

HOW INDOCTRINATION BREEDS BOKO-HARAM TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

Terrorism results from human choice and bystander indifference and constitutes an extreme assault on human life (Ajah, 2019). There is need to understand what informs the choice to engage in terrorist activities, what moulds this choice and what is responsible for the spark that ignites the fire of this choice. This segment of the paper will dwell on finding answers to the above posers particularly as it relates to the activities of the deadly Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria.

Indoctrination takes place when one circumvents reasoning and imparts a way of thinking based on something other than the force of evidence (Nweke & Ajah, 2017). The freedom to think any teaching through without any pressures before one

accepts such teachings is what distinguishes indoctrination from other forms of teaching. Indoctrination does not give such freedom to individuals, as they are unable to reason rationally, not because they do not want to, but because they never get the chance to think. Richter, Stein, Barnea and Sherman (2009) argue that the indoctrination of specific ideological perspectives is a necessary precursor and predictor to incitement to genocidal and terrorist tendencies. Clearly, incitement does not pertain to a belief system; it consists of speech, writing, and images whose purpose is to rouse individuals or groups to violent action. However, incitement alone does not necessarily lead to the perpetration of acts of violence in the form of terrorist activities (Richter, Stein, Barnea & Sherman, 2009). The impression is that those carrying out the acts were likely already programmed or conditioned by prior indoctrination

Huttunen (2016) explains indoctrination as the unethical influencing in education and the passing on of beliefs without leaving room for critical thinking and assessment. As with all terrorist organizations, this is a popular strategy employed by Boko Haram in recruiting and influencing sympathizers. Indoctrination includes the systematic transmission of values or beliefs representing the core ethos of any given group. It is often comprehensive, intergenerational, and deeply embedded within society. Indoctrination instills and



reinforces fundamental beliefs and messages, which program audiences to be receptive to explicit instructions or actions based on that ethos.

Terrorist activities by Boko Haram have continued to fester over the years in the Northern parts of Nigeria. Attempts have been made by scholars to unravel the causes and motives behind the involvement of people in such terrorist activities (Adesoji, Abdullahi & Eva, 2018; Farouk, 2012). However, none of these efforts has centered on the role of indoctrination despite evidence that it is an inevitable precursor to involvement to terrorist activities (Richter, Stein, Barnea & Sherman, 2009). From the wee days of Boko Haram's emergence till date, its activities and recruitment patterns have largely been fueled by indoctrination. Boko Haram, simply translated from Hausa to English, means "western education is forbidden. This forms the crux of the terrorist groups' ideology (Johnson, 2011). Boko Haram aims to create an Islamic state, impose sharia law in Northern Nigeria, do away with western principles and culture, and rid society of bad governance, corruption and moral depravation which they believe are against the tenets of Islam. According to Johnson (2011), the founder of Boko Haram (Mohammad Yusuf) was a radical Islamic cleric who trained as a Salafist (a school of thought often associated with Jihad) and was strongly influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah (a fourteen century legal scholar) who preached Islamic fundamentalism. It was reported that Yusuf set-up a mosque and an Islamic school in Maiduguri in 2002 (which attracted students from northern Nigeria and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon) to realize his aims of islamizing Nigeria (Farouk, 2012). This created a fertile ground for what has eventually turned out to be the 3rd deadliest terror group in the world (Global Terror Index, 2019)

Boko Haram terrorists have the capacity to evoke total commitment and fanaticism from their members; they are characterized by the suspension of doubt and an end-justifies-the-means view of the world – in contrast to the supposedly more measured attitudes of secular groups (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). This they do by employing the tactics of indoctrination and cashing in all available loopholes like poverty, injustice and religion. Over the years, Boko Haram has employed religious teaching, skewing same to its advantage and indoctrinating youths, adults, women and children into its beliefs and ideologies. Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that indoctrinations of this nature are accompanied by strong claims of moral justification and an enduring absolutism, characterised by the intensity of the religious activist's commitment.

Moreover, it is suggested that in some cases the certainties of the religious viewpoint and the promises of the next world are primary motivating factors in driving insecure, alienated and marginalized youths to Boko Haram terrorists as a means of psychological empowerment. It is further argued that such impressionable, alienated and disempowered young people are vulnerable to forms of brainwashing and undue influence by recruiters, extremist preachers or radical materials on the internet (Hoffman, 2006).

Romero (2007) opines that Islamist terrorist connections can provide social backing, meaning to life (to compensate for the spiritual emptiness felt), and a social or collective identity mainly based on the pride of forming part of the jihad as the only way of reaching the power and glory of Islam. Boko Haram engages in brainwashing children by teaching them about the so called benefits of engaging in terrorist activities with its benefits both here and in the afterlife. The vulnerability of the almajiri children for example is a typical exemplification of the power of indoctrination in breeding terrorists. The Alamjiri educational system practiced in Northern Nigeria has been observed to provide a fertile ground for extremist Imams and Islamic scholars/teachers to consciously train children who would become sympathetic of terrorist activities and will be willing to join one, once the opportunity presents itself. Indeed, poverty, unemployment, injustice and other social problems may not necessarily be the sole causes of involvement in terrorist activities. Rather, the content of educational materials and teachings offered, anchored on extremist Islamic principles could act as powerful indoctrination tools, preparing the children and youths for life as terrorists, with the slightest chance they get.

Arena and Arrigo (2006) identified three important factors in the formation of a terrorist identity through the tool of indoctrination. First, there is one's socialisation toward a basic set of beliefs, attitudes, socio-cultural and political values, and favoured perspectives in which to see the world. In this sense, there is a conscious socialization into placing value on terrorist activities, revering terrorists and considering them as heroes instead of looking at them with disdain and disgust. Second, identification is influenced by the psychological needs intensively pressing (on the individual) for actualization through behaviour and commitment. Noteworthy is the actualization drive that socialization implants into adults/children who are exposed to terrorist indoctrinations. There is a conscious effort to engage in jihad, to benefit from the ascribed advantages of involvement in terrorist activities.' Third, some catalytic events must transpire. As stated earlier, indoctrination creates a fertile ground



for terrorist activities to flourish. It is a precursor to terrorist inclinations. Book Haram terrorists are firstly indoctrinated before the opportunity to become terrorists or manifest their terrorist tenancies presents itself. Before any form of manifestation, there has to be incitement, to trigger the already nurtured (through years of indoctrination) terrorist tendencies.

The preeminent feature of a nation-state is its system of education (Ben-Israel, 2011). Textbooks, among other state-sanctioned means of education, are one of the most important channels for indoctrination. The messages found in school books reflect the core values, morals, and beliefs a given society wishes to promote. School books are especially effective as children are a captive and often vulnerable audience. Specific messages, both positive and negative, are delivered to the young even in the form of nursery rhymes and early formative education, the effects of which are enduring and intergenerational. School books are used in a controlled environment—the classroom—and represent ideology which symbolizes the intent of an organized authority. Exposure to messages that incite against others have proven to be a potent tool in the hands of Boko Haram terrorists. The adoption and practice of almajiri system of education, which in most cases expose children to uncontrolled educational materials, continues to act as a powerful indoctrination instrument

PECULIARITY OF DE-INDOCTRINATION IN ADDRESSING BOKO HARAM TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

The ghastly consequences of terrorism are man-made. Therefore, their prevention should be man-made also. Our premise is that prediction and prevention can counter hateful indoctrination that leads to incitement, willful acts of violence, and ultimately, involvement in terrorist activities. This can be achieved by de-indoctrination.

Indoctrination remains a potent tool in the hands of terrorists especially as it relates to recruiting sympathizers. Many young people are recruited by sympathetic family members or are led to believe that membership helps defend their families or communities. The search for group-based identity, the ideological appeal of the group, real or perceived exclusion, grievance, or cultural threat, the potential for economic gain or long-term economic stability, prospects of fame, glory, or respect; and personal connections, including family and friendship networks are some of the themes around which indoctrination into terrorist ideologies and principles are couched.

De-indoctrination implies a conscious effort to unlearn what has been learnt, by teaching what ought to

be taught. In this sense, de-indoctrination refers to the opposite of indoctrination in the sense that first, it tries to correct what has been passed on to people as the right knowledge and information, by teaching them what they should know. Over the years, some religious and traditional leaders have been allowed to play significant roles in tutoring and mentoring young people in the Northern part of the country. While this has yielded positive results in some instance, it has also resulted to the indoctrination of young people with fanatical and sometimes bigoted teachings from this religious leaders.

In attempting to develop realistic programs designed to de-indoctrinate individuals, it is vital to clearly understand the underlying reasons why individuals enter a path to radicalization in the first place (Horgan, 2005). With law enforcement and community collaboration, there are potentially more opportunities to identify the issues faced by such “troubled” individuals, and there is a higher likelihood of identifying intervention strategies that could prevent them from seeking violence as a means for potential retribution.

Unfortunately government bodies behave as though they are hamstrung by political agendas, allegiances, funding, media and fundamental lack of knowledge of motivating factors. As a result they are constantly in a race to prevent extreme violent action, as opposed to addressing the root causes behind these actions. Once individuals are indoctrinated, it becomes more difficult to have them trash such long held views and ideologies (Striegler, 2013).

In dealing with individuals who have been intensively indoctrinated; have been influenced to hate; who are meticulously trained and taught to maintain the highest of vigilance in dealing with their enemies, and who believe that the only important thing in the world is the furtherance of their cause (Wilkinson, 2006), it becomes evident that employing the carrot and stick approach when this individuals exhibit their violent terrorist tendencies will achieve minimal results as evident in the endless war against Boko Haram in the Northern part of Nigeria. Conscious steps to counter the teachings of hatred they have acquired and replacing same with more friendlier teachings championed by the government, traditional and religious leaders will work better. Both those that have been indoctrinated and are already terrorists and those who are waiting for the right time to manifest what they have learnt can be recovered through de-indoctrination

CONCLUSION

Countering terrorist Boko Haram in Nigeria remains the topmost security concern of the Federal



Government. While several measures that have been put in place to ensure terrorism is defeated in the country continue to prove abortive, there has been little effort towards tackling the root cause of this menace. Available data show that government has been treating the symptoms and not the causes of the problem. Terrorism is rooted in ideologies. Clear cut measures to defeat such ideologies must be adopted, if the fight is to be won. There must be clear cut measures to ensure that such ideologies are not passed to citizens of the country and also to ensure that the terrorists do not find any group of people in the country that will be sympathetic to their cause as such people will eventually be willing to join the terrorists when given the opportunity. It is therefore important that those who have been indoctrinated over the years with terrorist ideologies are de-indoctrinated. This will involve conscious efforts aimed at reexamining the type of education available to youths and children in the Northern part of the country. Extremist ideologies are often passed down through education (both formal and informal). Therefore, the need to examine and correct the all forms of extremist concepts and teachings cannot be overemphasized.

The almajiri system of education appears to be a fertile ground for indoctrination of children in the North into extremist ideologies. Terrorists will continue to find this segment of youths in the country as willing tools that will help in propagating their terrorist ideologies. To correct the obvious anomaly, almajiri system of education should be designed in such a way that there is no room for indoctrination. Those already indoctrinated should be salvaged through de-indoctrination. De-indoctrination might prove difficult to implement due to its focus on what people are taught and what they are exposed to. However, its implementation remains the most viable option towards ending the Boko Hartam menace which has resulted to the death of thousands, the displacement of millions and the loss of billions of naira in a bid to bring an end to it. Security agencies, the government (state and federal), traditional and religious leaders, educationists and international partners should focus attention on the type of message people take in. attention also be focused on countering already assimilated negative message/teaching with positive messages/teachings to ensure that people who have been indoctrinated into terrorist ideologies by what they have been taught and exposed to are de-indoctrinated by positive teaching that will counter the existing knowledge/information available to them.

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