Consolidation has been a defining feature of Indian public sector banking reforms in the past decade. Policymakers have justified mergers of public sector banks (PSBs) as a way to strengthen balance sheets, improve efficiency, and tackle the chronic problem of non-performing assets (NPAs). This paper evaluates whether these objectives have been achieved, with a particular focus on two major episodes: the merger of State Bank of India (SBI) with its associate banks in 2017, and the “mega-mergers” of 2019–2020 that reduced the number of PSBs from 27 in 2017 to 12 by 2020. Using financial performance indicators drawn from RBI reports and bank annual statements, the analysis compares pre- and post-merger trends in NPAs, profitability, and capital adequacy. The findings suggest that while consolidation created larger banks with stronger capital buffers on paper, the underlying NPA problem persisted, raising questions about whether mergers are a structural solution or merely a cosmetic one. Situating the Indian case in global context, the paper draws lessons from Japan, Europe, and the United States, where consolidation has had mixed outcomes. The analysis concludes that mergers alone cannot resolve deep-rooted asset quality issues without parallel reforms in credit appraisal, governance, and risk management.