

Chief Editor

Dr. A. Singaraj, M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D.

Editor

Mrs.M.Josephin Immaculate Ruba

EDITORIAL ADVISORS

1. Prof. Dr.Said I.Shalaby, MD,Ph.D.
Professor & Vice President
Tropical Medicine,
Hepatology & Gastroenterology, NRC,
Academy of Scientific Research and Technology,
Cairo, Egypt.
2. Dr. Mussie T. Tessema,
Associate Professor,
Department of Business Administration,
Winona State University, MN,
United States of America,
3. Dr. Mengsteab Tesfayohannes,
Associate Professor,
Department of Management,
Sigmund Weis School of Business,
Susquehanna University,
Selinsgrove, PENN,
United States of America,
4. Dr. Ahmed Sebihi
Associate Professor
Islamic Culture and Social Sciences (ICSS),
Department of General Education (DGE),
Gulf Medical University (GMU),
UAE.
5. Dr. Anne Maduka,
Assistant Professor,
Department of Economics,
Anambra State University,
Igbariam Campus,
Nigeria.
6. Dr. D.K. Awasthi, M.Sc., Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Chemistry,
Sri J.N.P.G. College,
Charbagh, Lucknow,
Uttar Pradesh. India
7. Dr. Tirtharaj Bhoi, M.A, Ph.D,
Assistant Professor,
School of Social Science,
University of Jammu,
Jammu, Jammu & Kashmir, India.
8. Dr. Pradeep Kumar Choudhury,
Assistant Professor,
Institute for Studies in Industrial Development,
An ICSSR Research Institute,
New Delhi- 110070, India.
9. Dr. Gyanendra Awasthi, M.Sc., Ph.D., NET
Associate Professor & HOD
Department of Biochemistry,
Dolphin (PG) Institute of Biomedical & Natural
Sciences,
Dehradun, Uttarakhand, India.
10. Dr. C. Satapathy,
Director,
Amity Humanity Foundation,
Amity Business School, Bhubaneswar,
Orissa, India.



ISSN (Online): 2455-7838

SJIF Impact Factor : 6.093

EPRA International Journal of

Research & Development (IJRD)

Monthly Peer Reviewed & Indexed
International Online Journal

Volume: 4, Issue:4, April 2019



Published By
EPRA Publishing

CC License





THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION ON DOMESTIC POLITICS IN SOMALIA, CASE STUDY MOGADISHU

Ibrahim Mohamed Ali

Faculty of Postgraduate Studies, Master of Public Administration. University of Somalia (UNISO), Mogadishu-Somalia

ABSTRACT

The general objective of this study was the effect of foreign intervention on domestic politics in Somalia case study Mogadishu. Particularly, the study examined the effects of foreign Military intervention and foreign Electoral intervention on domestic politics in Somalia case study Mogadishu. The target population of this study was 200 which are accessible population. This study adopted a quantitative research design especially cross sectional research design. Purposive sampling or judgmental sampling was used to select a sample of public servants and educators in Mogadishu out of the target population of 200 public servants and educators by using Slovin's formula of sampling. The sample size was 132. Primary data was collect by the use of self-administered questionnaires. Data was collected from questionnaires and coded and key into a computer the Quantitative data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 20). Factor analysis was used to assess the validity and Cronbach alpha to assess reliability of the questionnaire. The study ends that foreign intervention has a weak negative significant effect on Domestic Politics. There was a moderate negative and highly significant correlation between foreign military intervention and Domestic politics. There was a moderate negative and highly significant correlation between foreign electoral interventions on Domestic politics. The researcher met various challenges when conducting the research those challenges included the Public servants do not want to give information due to the confidentiality of this topic which was concerning foreign intervention. The study recommended Inclusion of all Public servants in the collecting information because Public servants' participation in foreign intervention will improve the findings the research.

KEY WORDS: *Foreign intervention, Military Intervention, Electoral Intervention, Domestic Politics*

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In ancient Rome, it was common knowledge that the balance of capabilities affects the nature of combat between actors. Romans were also well aware that an intervention could change the course and nature of fighting (Lockyer, 2008). Since the end of the Cold War, states have increasingly come under pressure to intervene militarily and, in fact, have intervened

militarily to protect citizens other than their own from humanitarian disasters. Recent efforts to enforce protected areas for Kurds and no-fly zones over Shiites in Iraq, efforts to alleviate starvation and establish some kind of political order in Somalia, the huge un military effort to disarm parties and rebuild a state in Cambodia, and to some extent even the military actions to bring humanitarian relief in Bosnia are all instances

of military action whose primary goal is not territorial or strategic but humanitarian (Finnemore, 1996). In the Afghan when the first small groups of tribesmen began ambushing government troops in the Afghan mountains in 1978, they frequently did so using slingshots, axes and ancient British firearms (Lockyer, 2008). A study demonstrates that the small positive effect of foreign aid on democracy in sub-Saharan African countries between 1975 and 1997 is limited to the post-Cold War period (Dunning, 2004). The past several decades of US intervention in Somalia produced violent destabilization, dysfunction, and uncertainty, creating refugee outflows and terrorist networks against which the US is currently tightening its security cordons (Besteman, 2017b).

Analysts often argue that foreign support to secessionist groups is the determining factor in the success or failure of secession (Bélanger, Duchesne, & Paquin, 2005). Even a brief survey of civil wars from ancient times through to the modern Spanish, South Vietnamese and Bosnian conflicts suggests that foreign intervention is both common and 1 foreign intervention can potentially have a major impact on the course of civil wars. Indeed, foreign intervention in civil war is the rule rather than the exception, with 71 percent of civil wars recording at least one intervention. 2 Furthermore, foreign intervention can be influential in changing the route of civil wars (Lockyer, 2008). The results of a study shows that harsh foreign interventions had many deleterious consequences, acting as an initial force for armed resistance, while also acting as a continuous source of controversy which some of the religious groups exploited to gain new recruits (Mueller, 2018). In International Relations, the term intervention simply refers to one state's intrusion into the domestic affairs of another (Lockyer, 2008).

Foreign intervention is defined as the transfer of resources from an external state to a contesting party in a civil war (Lockyer, 2008). Foreign intervention manipulates the balance of capabilities in a predictable Manner (Lockyer, 2008). In part, the significant impact of foreign intervention on the course of civil wars is explained by the majority of interventions having taken the form of providing assistance to one side in the conflict. Between 1945 and 1994, over 95 percent of foreign interventions in civil wars consisted of the transfer of money, arms, or foreign troops to a aggressive in the civil war. Somalia has been lacking a functioning state since the overthrow of the military government, led by General Siyad Bare, in 1991 by a clan based rebel factions, spearheaded by warlords and politicians. However, personal interests, power and economic ambitions of warlords caused the rebel factions to fail in the formation of inclusive government to heal the country from what was perceived by them as social, economical and political

injustices committed by the military regime (Møller, 2009). Consequently, the country's decades of protracted civil war started. The war in Somalia went through different phases and caused the death of thousands of Somalis while many others left the country to get peace and life in other countries (Møller, 2009). Throughout the lawlessness of the country, warlords and clan militias fought for the control of power and resources. This war for resources and power never remained between only the armed groups but it also continued within every group and clan (Møller, 2009). Despite failure to establish a Somali central state in over two decades, parts of the country made significant progress in terms of security, reconciliation and peace building (Møller, 2009).

The U.S. effort in Afghanistan a multilateral undertaking will be more successful than its intervention in Iraq which is a largely unilateral endeavor. This may be the case because Afghanistan has numerous governments involved in the intervention that result in a more democratic nature of the intervention itself born out of their varying interests and concerns. Iraq is an intervention that places almost all of the strain of intervention on the United States (Citation, 2011). A review has found that there are many gaps in the evidence on humanitarian responses to acute watery diarrhea (AWD) in Ethiopia, specifically in terms of necessary cross district and/or cross border co-ordination, as well as the human and financial resources needed for such aid. This is one of the kinds of intervention (Tull, 2018).

In the scramble for Africa, Somali-speakers found themselves divided among five different countries ruled by others: French Djibouti, British-ruled Somaliland, Ethiopia, Italian-ruled Somalia, and British-ruled Kenya. Colonial rule was far from secure, of course. On the Somalia-Ethiopia border, the anticolonial fighter Mohamed Abdillahi Hassan, whom the British colonists called the Mad Mullah, fought in a series of spectacular successes against Ethiopian and European control from 1899 until his death in 1920 (Besteman, 2017b). Somalia's undoing came at the end of a long series of foreign interventions and incursions: from the colonial era when British, Italians, Ethiopians and Somalis fought over the creation of borders and governance, to the geopolitics of the Cold War that poured millions of dollars of foreign funds into the coffers of Somalia's dictator, from superpowers trying to buy influence and military access, to foreign funded efforts in the neoliberalizing 1980s to privatize Somalia's economy and redefine land and water as resources to be bought and sold. When foreign support for Somalia's dictator ended after the Cold War in 1990 and his government collapsed, the militias that deposed him turned against each other to fight over who could lay claim to the state and its lucrative resources, including foreign aid (Besteman, 2017b).

Somali airspace from a US military base in Djibouti and from US ships in the Indian Ocean to kill suspected anti-US terrorists. Local security is provided (Besteman, 2017b).

Somalia has been without functioning state for over two decades. The country has not experienced any government that has the capacity to maintain the rule of law in its entirety after the overthrow of the military government in 1991 by clan based militia factions (Møller, 2009).

Although there has been a lot of research done on the relationship between foreign intervention and domestic politics. Some research suggests that there is a positive correlation between foreign intervention and domestic politics. While others have found that there is not. Intervention by the U.S. is often justified as being for the promotion of democracy abroad (Citation, 2011). While other study argues that foreign intervention exacerbated the existing failure of the government to build standard state building institutions, and created further difficulties in forging nation-building (Izamin, Christie, States, Christie, & Frankel, n.d.). However there is a contradiction result in the effect of foreign intervention on domestic politics in Mogadishu- Somalia. Therefore this study will exam the effect of foreign intervention on domestic politics Mogadishu- Somalia.

Foreign interventions in civil wars consisted of the transfer of money, arms, or foreign troops to a belligerent in the civil war (Lockyer, 2008). Neutral interventions aimed at providing humanitarian assistance or fostering the conditions for a peace settlement have been rare (Lockyer, 2008). After the overthrow of the military government in 1991 by clan based militia factions. Over two decades of disorder, violence and extensive humanitarian problems followed the downfall of the military government. Consequently, the country has fallen into the hands of warlords, clan-militia and other interest driven actors which can be external actors and internal actors (Møller, 2009). The creation of Somalia's first internationally recognized government in two-decades was a significant milestone for post-political conflict reconstruction (Supervisor, Reader, & Reader, 2018). In 1992, more than 25,000 United States forces landed in Somalia as part of a 37,000-strong United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) operation. In 2011, a combined total of 8000+ Kenyan and Ethiopian forces were ordered into Somalia (Hesse, 2016).

Although there has been a lot of research done on the relationship between foreign intervention and domestic politics. Some research suggests that there is a positive correlation between foreign intervention and domestic politics. While others have found that there is not. Intervention by the U.S. is often justified as being for the promotion of democracy abroad (Citation,

2011). but other study argues that foreign intervention exacerbated the existing failure of the government to build standard state building institutions, and created further difficulties in forging nation-building (Izamin et al., n.d.). Accordingly, America's intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 failed to remedy adequately the circumstances and concerns which spawned the perceived need for Kenyan and Ethiopian forces to intervene in Somalia a generation later, in 2011 (Hesse, 2016).

However there is a contradiction result in the effect of foreign intervention on domestic politics. Therefore this study will exam the effect of foreign intervention on domestic politics Mogadishu- Somalia.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the end of the Cold War, states have increasingly come under pressure to intervene militarily and, in fact, have intervened militarily to protect citizens other than their own from humanitarian disasters (Finnemore, 1996). Foreign intervention is defined as the transfer of resources from an external state to a contesting party in a civil war (Lockyer, 2008). Foreign intervention manipulates the balance of capabilities in a predictable Manner (Lockyer, 2008). In International Relations, the term intervention simply refers to one state's intrusion into the domestic affairs of another (Lockyer, 2008). In part, the significant impact of foreign intervention on the course of civil wars is explained by the majority of interventions having taken the form of providing assistance to one side in the conflict. Between 1945 and 1994, over 95 percent of foreign interventions in civil wars consisted of the transfer of money, arms, or foreign troops to a aggressive in the civil war(Møller, 2009).

Somalia has been lacking a functioning state since the overthrow of the military government, led by General Siyad Bare, in 1991 by a clan based rebel factions, spearheaded by warlords and politicians(Møller, 2009). The war and conflict in Somalia have both internal and external dichotomous dimensions. Yet, studies on the Somali state collapse and conflict often emphasize the internal elements and, as a result, the interminable war is subsumed into one within Somali clans and communities (Ingiriis, 2018). However, personal interests, power and economic ambitions of warlords caused the rebel factions to fail in the formation of inclusive government to heal the country from what was perceived by them as social, economical and political injustices committed by the military regime (Møller, 2009).

External intervention has frustrated and continues to frustrate peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, adding various adverse layers to an already complicated and complex conflict (Ingiriis, 2018). Foreign intervention whether international or regional must have institutional mechanisms to be

legitimate in the eyes of the international community. Furthermore, international and regional interventions require universal institutions to legitimize intrusion, while the regional interventions need not legitimization but continuous support from the outside (Ingiriis, 2018). As such, the Ethiopian intervention is not only pursued for a political purpose, but also for military or security reasons (Ingiriis, 2018). It is in this sense that the military component suited and served well for the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia (Ingiriis, 2018). To unravel the implications of external intervention, it is necessary to first understand the Ethiopian interests in Somalia and to the wider Horn region (Ingiriis, 2018).

Previous research and reports regarding the role of foreign actors, especially, the neighboring states, made different conclusions regarding why regional states failed to produce a common regional resolution approach in resolving Somalia's conflict. Authors like KidistMulugeta(2009) explained this as a result of the regions' conflicting interests in Somalia and other unresolved intra and interstate conflicts between and within countries in the region. Some of the scholars argue that Somalia lacks a great power friend to strive for its settlement while some others like, Moller (2009) explained that multiple hands of neighbouring states in this conflict have serious consequences in prolongation of this conflict and obstacles facing resolution efforts (Moller, 2009).

Foreign military intervention is one of the most common types of interstate military force used over recent decades (Publications, 2018). In 1992, more than 25,000 United States forces landed in Somalia as part of a 37,000-strong United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) operation (Western, 2002). On November 21, 1992, Gen. Colin Powell's chief deputy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. David Jeremiah, stunned a National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia by announcing, "If you think U.S. forces are needed, we can do the job."¹ Four days later President George H.W. Bush decided that U.S. forces were indeed needed (Western, 2002). On December 9, 1992, 1,300 U.S. Marines landed in Mogadishu, and within weeks more than 25,000 U.S. soldiers were on the ground in Somalia (Western, 2002). But America's intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 failed to remedy adequately the circumstances and concerns which spawned the perceived need for Kenyan and Ethiopian forces to intervene in Somalia a generation later, in 2011 (Western, 2002).

AMISOM deployed to Somalia in March 2007 in the aftermath of the Ethiopian military campaign that had installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu in December 2006 (Williams, 2013). AMISOM was originally mandated by the African Union (AU) in January 2007 but was endorsed shortly afterwards by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (Williams, 2013). It had an initial authorized

strength of 8,000 and was mandated to protect transitional government personnel and institutions, conduct military enforcement operations against anti-government actors and facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations (Williams, 2013). AMISOM's initial deployed strength consisted of approximately 1,600 Ugandan soldiers (Williams, 2013). They were joined from December 2007 by a battalion of Burundi troops. After that, the mission grew in size incrementally and evolved, reflecting the changing context in Somalia and international responses to the country's many problems (Williams, 2013). Until the last Ethiopian troops withdrew from Mogadishu in early 2009, AMISOM protected key members of the TFG and a number of strategic locations in the city from armed opposition(Williams, 2013). These included the air and sea ports, the presidential palace at Villa Somalia, and the K4 junction linking them(Williams, 2013).

The AU originally envisaged that after six months a UN peacekeeping operation would take over from AMISOM (Williams, 2013). This did not happen for a variety of reasons. Instead, AMISOM was supported by the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and from 2009, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provided a logistical support package to AMISOM forces in Mogadishu (Williams, 2013). After more than four years of bloody fighting in the streets of Mogadishu, since August 2011 the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has increasingly been hailed as a success story (Williams, 2013). It attracted additional contributing countries, reaching a strength of nearly 18,000 personnel by late-2012 (Williams, 2013). In 2011, a combined total of 8000+ Kenyan and Ethiopian forces were ordered into Somalia (Hesse, 2016). But in spite of these important achievements, AMISOM continued to suffer from a number of significant problems (Williams, 2013). These problems are a legacy of several unresolved strategic challenges which have plagued the mission since it first deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007 (Williams, 2013). Unfortunately for Kenyan and Ethiopian soldiers, Somalia's politicians and political processes might relegate them to realizing little more success than their American predecessors(Williams, 2013).

Electoral interventions have been frequently used by the great powers ever since the rise of meaningful competitive elections around the world. Such interventions have been found to have significant effects on the results of the intervened elections determining in many cases the identity of them winner(Levin, 2018). Electoral interventions—an attempt by a foreign power to intervene in another country's election in order to help or hinder one of the candidates or parties— are a common form of intervention (Levin 2016a). To public threats to cut off

foreign aid in the event of victory by the disfavored side (as the United States did during the 2009 Lebanese elections (Ghattas,2009).

To shape electoral outcomes, electoral interventions affect a key democratic institution—the national-level elections and the process by which the executive is peacefully replaced or retained. As a result, such interventions may have major medium- and long-term effects on the target’s level of democracy (Levin, 2018). Indeed, American government officials have frequently claimed, at least in public, that American partisan electoral interventions are done in order to protect or consolidate another country’s democracy. For example, in his memoirs, a former senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official defended the American electoral interventions in Chile in 1964 and in 1970 by claiming that “their purpose had been to preserve the democratic constitutional order” (Meyer 1980, 182).

Electoral interventions—an attempt by a foreign power to intervene in another country’s election in order to help or hinder one of the candidates or parties—are a common form of intervention (Levin 2016a). How do voters react to foreign interventions in the quintessentially domestic concern of elections? We are aware of virtually no prior work in this area. Dominant theories in international relations focus almost entirely on states and their leaders and usually bring in voters only as a stylized fact (Corstange & Marinov, 2012).

By conceptualizing two types of foreign involvement in an election: a *partisan* one and a *process* one. A partisan intervention occurs when a foreign actor seeks to advance a specific ticket.¹³ A process intervention, in contrast, occurs when foreign actors seek to support the rules of democratic contestation, irrespective of who wins. Voters, we suggest, can categorize foreign activities into one of these two broad conceptual categories, as when the activity involves foreigners giving cash to candidates, threatening sanctions unless a candidate is elected, or seeking an independent electoral commission. Hence, intervening powers either support a preferred contestant or else the integrity of the contest itself (Corstange & Marinov, 2012).

In democracies, national-level elections are pivotal events, enabling a peaceful change in the makeup of the main decision makers and their domestic coalitions. They often lead to major shifts in a country’s domestic and foreign policies and affect its propensity to experience both domestic and international conflict. Even in electoral authoritarian regimes, relatively competitive elections can have significant consequences on domestic and international politics. In some of these cases, competitive elections even lead to the fall of the existing leadership, the rise of a new regime or a full-scale transition to

democracy(Levin, 2016). Successful electoral interventions to usually reduce the level of democracy in the target. Successful electoral interventions would be expected to be bad for democracy as a result (Levin, 2018).

Recent events and the international relations literature have made us acutely aware of the impact of world market forces upon domestic politics (Gourevitch, 1978). Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle (Putnam, 1988). Sub-sample analyses conducted for major powers, democracies and autocracies to understand the relative importance of international, domestic and contextual factors on the intervention decisions of different types of states. The empirical findings show that the strategic significance of the conflict state, interventions by rivals or allies, and domestic considerations of leaders play a more critical role than the attributes of the civil conflict when foreign powers are deciding whether and on whose side to intervene in a civil conflict. While these empirical findings provide an improved understanding of the rationale behind foreign military interventions in civil conflicts, this dissertation also contributes theoretically to the current literature by bringing back the much needed foreign policy decision making perspective into the study of interventions (Wennesland & Eide, 2013).

There has been a lot of research done on the relationship between foreign intervention and domestic politics. Some research suggests that there is a positive correlation between foreign intervention and domestic politics. While others have found that there is not. Intervention by the U.S. is often justified as being for the promotion of democracy abroad (Citation, 2011). but other study argues that foreign intervention exacerbated the existing failure of the government to build standard state building institutions, and created further difficulties in forging nation-building (Izamin et al., n.d.). Accordingly, America’s intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 failed to remedy adequately the circumstances and concerns which spawned the perceived need for Kenyan and Ethiopian forces to intervene in Somalia a generation later, in 2011 (Hesse, 2016).

Foreign military intervention is one of the most common types of interstate military force used over recent decades (Publications, 2018). There has been a little of research done on the relationship between military intervention and domestic policy (Citation, 2011). In contrast to a military intervention on behalf of the rebel group, it is difficult to make a specific prediction of how an increase in the relative capabilities of a rebel group will influence the probability of military intervention on behalf of the government (Koga, 2011). When 1,300 U.S. Marines landed in Mogadishu, and within weeks more than

25,000 U.S. soldiers were on the ground in Somalia (Western, 2002). Thus America's intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 failed to remedy adequately the circumstances and concerns which spawned the perceived need for Kenyan and Ethiopian forces to intervene in Somalia a generation later, in 2011 (Western, 2002).

However there is a need of a further research in the relationship between foreign interventions militarily and the domestic policy in Mogadishu Somalia.

According to Hesse (2016) conducted a study about "Two Generations, Two Interventions: In One of the World's Most-Failed States: The United States, Kenya and Ethiopia in Somali". The article uses public goods theory to contend that military interventions that are ostensibly peacekeeping in nature can be inherently inadequate because 'self-interest works against the interests of the collective' (Bobrowand Boyer, 1997: 726). Accordingly, America's intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 failed to remedy adequately the circumstances and concerns which spawned the perceived need for Kenyan and Ethiopian forces to intervene in Somalia a generation later, in 2011. Unfortunately for Kenyan and Ethiopian soldiers, Somalia's politicians and political processes might relegate them to realizing little more success than their American predecessors.

The article demonstrates that American soldiers were deployed to Somalia in the early days of a post-Cold War world, largely as a foreign policy experiment about how to deal with the threats 'small states' posed in a new world order. It is maintained that Kenyan and Ethiopian soldiers were deployed to Somalia to deal with some of the very threats American foreign policymakers had identified almost two decades earlier, from refugees to terrorism. The findings of the study the researcher received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

According to (Bélanger et al., 2005) conducted a study about "Foreign Interventions and Secessionist Movements: The Democratic Factor". This article explores the impact of political regime type on the decision of third states to support secessionist movements abroad. It suggests that democracies share political values, which lead them to oppose their mutual secessionist claims, while autocracies are not bound by this normative consideration. In order to test for the level and incidence of external support for secessionist groups, this article resorts to regression analysis ~Ordinary Least Squares! and maximum likelihood estimation ~Legit! Respectively. The results displayed in Tables to allow us to verify the hypotheses regarding the statistical significance of regime types, previously used alternative explanations and control

variables on the incidence and level of governmental external support for secessionist movements.

We are particularly interested in comparing the central hypothesis—that democratic states are unlikely to lend support to a secessionist movement in another democracy—to the standard explanations of vulnerability and ethnic ties. The statistical analysis supports the effect of the democratic factor: democracies rarely support secessionist groups emerging from democratic states. Moreover, it shows that there is no autocratic counterpart to this argument. This research also casts some serious doubts on the ability of conventional explanations—namely vulnerability and ethnic affinities—to explain external support to secessionist movements.

According to Williams (2013) conducted a study about "AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges Fighting for Peace in Somalia". This article analyzes seven strategic challenges which faced the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) between March 2007, when it first deployed to Mogadishu, and August 2012, when Somalis selected a new Federal Government to replace the existing transitional institutions. The seven strategic challenges were the initial international political context in which the mission deployed; problems of internal coordination between the mission's component parts; the lack of a reliable local partner with which to wage a counter-insurgency campaign; problems of strategic coordination among external partners; the nature of the enemy forces facing AMISOM, principally al-Shabaab; AMISOM's lack of relevant capabilities and resources to perform its mandated tasks; and the challenges of facilitating legitimate and effective governance structures, especially as AMISOM began to deploy outside Mogadishu from late 2011.

According to (Levin, 2016) conducted a study about "When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results". What are the electoral consequences of attempts by great powers to intervene in a partisan manner in another country's elections? Great powers frequently deploy partisan electoral interventions as a major foreign policy tool. For example, the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have intervened in one of every nine competitive national level executive elections between 1946 and 2000. However, scant scholarly research has been conducted about their effects on the election results in the target. I argue that such interventions usually significantly increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate and that overt interventions are more effective than covert interventions. The researcher tested these hypotheses utilizing a new, original dataset of all U.S. and USSR/Russian partisan electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000. I find strong support for both arguments.

Vojislav Kostunica’s campaign team had good reason to see the foreign support as critical to their victory. My findings demonstrate that, overall, partisan electoral interventions seem to substantively benefit the aided candidate or party. Furthermore, overt interventions prove to be significantly more effective than covert interventions in swaying elections. Of course, given the average effect that I find (about a 3 percent change in vote share), electoral interventions will not always assure victory for the great powers’ preferred candidates. However, such interventions often do swing elections. The evidence presented in this article suggests that in the foreseeable future, partisan electoral interventions will continue to be an effective way for great powers to determine the leadership of other states, regardless of whether their targets are governed by “competitive authoritarian,” partially democratic, or fully democratic regimes. These results also provide further—and cross-national—support for the finding of Corstange and Marinov (2012, 664–669) that no popular backlash effect existed in their survey experiment of overt intervention (Levin, 2016).

Future research should focus on other effects of electoral interventions. Partisan electoral interventions affect a key democratic institution—the national level elections and the process by which the executive is peacefully replaced or retained. As a result, such interventions may have major effects on the target. For example, one important direction for future research in this regard would be to investigate whether electoral interventions have ramifications for the level of democracy in the target over the medium and long term. Another important direction for future research would be the possible effect of electoral interventions on the target’s domestic stability (Levin, 2016).

According to Besteman(2017)conducted a study about “Experimenting in Somalia: The new security empire”. This study argues that Somalia’s recent history as a stateless region offers a cautionary and tragic case study of the long-term damages that ensue when wealthy states that intervene in poorer states in the name of their own security instead cause insecurity and inequities that enable violence, and then in response to that violence enact further securitization to protect themselves against the consequences of that damage. But rather than focusing on the state as a site of securitization. The study focused on those whose lives are made insecure by the retreat of their state government and the imposition in its place of security regimes that are not created by their own state government.

Security regimes overlap and compete, are instituted by different state and non state actors for different purposes, and by their incoherence and multiplicity raise questions about the definition, location, and relevance of the state in such regions. The

study explores the emergence of new, interlinked security regimes that are partially or wholly constituted through the logics of a new security empire designed to respond to US security concerns. By turning attention to the situations faced by those who live within the insecurities of stateless regions, the paper asks, what happens to the concept of securitization when the national- territorial state is not the entity that operates as a ‘state’ in the lives of people, even though their lives are overlain with multiple and overlapping regimes of securitization (Besteman, 2017).

According to Geddes(2002)conducted a study about “The Effect of Foreign Pressure on the Collapse of Authoritarian Regimes” This study focuses on the effect of economic sanctions, aid, and military intervention on the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. The analysis confirms the conventional wisdom that foreign pressure or intervention can help bring about regime transitions. It shows that two of the least subtle forms of foreign pressure, costly sanctions and direct military intervention do, on average, destabilize dictatorships. Cheap or symbolic sanctions, however, are associated with increased rather than decreased authoritarian durability. Aid and military intervention to support threatened dictators appear to be ineffective. The study also finds that although foreign pressures can encourage transitions, they do not overwhelm the domestic sources of authoritarian fragility or strength. The standard findings of previous research on the domestic causes of authoritarian breakdown are confirmed even with various foreign influences held constant.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

This study will adopt a quantitative research design especially descriptive research design, because it wants to evaluate the effects of Foreign Intervention, Foreign Intervention Militarily, Foreign Intervention Electorally on Domestic Policy in Mogadishu. The study will adopt a quantitative research design to measure the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Descriptive research design will help in exploring the relationship between Foreign Intervention, Foreign Intervention Militarily, and Foreign Intervention Electorally and Domestic Policy in Mogadishu. The dependent variable in this study will be Domestic Policy, while the independent variables will Foreign Intervention. Population refers to the entire group of people or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate, Sekaran (2010). The target population of this study will be conduct from Public servants and Educators in Mogadishu. There is more than one million people In Mogadishu but our study will focus on 2 groups of these people because these 2 groups are those who have information about foreign intervention. The target population of this study will be 200 which are accessible population.

Muganda (2010) states that the sampling frame or the survey frame is the list of accessible population of people, events or documents that could be including in a survey and from which a study will pick a sample to collect data. Saleemi (2009) defined sampling as a definite statistical plan concerned with all principal steps taken in the selection of a sample and the estimation procedure. The sampling frame of this study will be the two groups of people in Mogadishu. The sampling procedure of this study is used non-probability sampling procedure particularly purposive sampling or judgmental sampling. The researcher will select this sampling technique because it gives the opportunity to choose the members of target population who provides the accurate information or data (Saunders, et al, 2009). Judgmental sampling is a way to select population members who are good prospects for precise information. The main objective of using sample is to obtain accurate and reliable information within minimum cost, time and energy. The sample size of this study was calculated from the Slovin's formula, since the study population (N) is 200. Error of tolerance was 0.05. Thus the sample size was 133 respondents.

Both primary and secondary data was collected for the purpose of this study. The study used primary data obtained through questionnaires with a selected two groups of people in Mogadishu. The questionnaire will be structured questionnaire having closed-ended questions. The questionnaire was divided into two parts. The general advantage of questionnaire method over other data collection methods is that information can be collected from larger sample (Amin, 2005). The objective of the first part aimed at accessing demographic information of the 2 groups. The second part of the questionnaire will be examined the relationship between Foreign Intervention, Foreign Intervention Militarily, and Foreign Intervention Electorally and Domestic Policy in Mogadishu. Secondary data was collected by use of desk search techniques from published reports and other documents. Secondary data included the companies' publications, journals, periodicals and information obtained from the internet.

According to Lindsay (2010) data collection is the systematic approach to gathering and measuring information from a variety of sources to get a complete and accurate picture of an area of interest. Proceeding from general to specific research questions, makes the research activities in any project more focused - in terms of data needed to answer the research questions. Hence questions associated with data collection are some of the most important in any research enquiry. Data collection will focus on the main objectives of the study, so as to provide the study with data that would be both adequate and objective. Data collection entailed use of the structured questionnaire to obtain

Primary data. The questionnaire is preferred over other methods of collecting data because of its capability to extract information from the respondents as well as giving the researcher a better understanding and a more insightful interpretation of the results from the study. Questionnaire is also preferred because they enable the researcher obtain more up to date information as well as obtain information which might not be captured in the other data collection techniques (Cooper and Schindler, 2013).

Creswell (2013) indicated that pilot study is a trial run of the major study. Its purpose is to check the time taken to complete the questionnaire, whether it is too long or too short, too easy or too difficult and to check the clarity of the questionnaire items, and to eliminate ambiguities or difficulties in wording. The researcher selected a pilot group of respondents from the target population to test the reliability of the research instrument including the wording, structure and sequence of the questions. The respondents were conveniently selected since statistical conditions are not necessary in the pilot study Cooper and Schindler (2013). The purpose will to refine the questionnaire so that respondents in the major study had no problem in answering the questions. The pilot study allowed for pre-testing of the research instrument. The rule of thumb is that 1% of the sample should constitute the pilot test (Cooper & Schindler, 2013). Reliability is a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results after repeated trials (Ngechu, 2004). This is done by determining the association in between scores obtained from different administrations of the scale. If the association is high, the scale yields consistent results, thus it is reliable. Cronbach's alpha is used to determine the internal reliability of the questionnaire used in this study. Values range between 0 and 1.0; while 1.0 indicates perfect reliability, the value 0.70 is deemed to be the lower level of acceptability (Hair, Black, Barry, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).

Validity is defined as the accuracy and meaningfulness of inferences, which are based on the research results. In other words validity is the degree to which results obtained from the analysis of the data actually represents the phenomena under study. It indicates how accurate the data obtained in the study represent the variables of the study (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). The researcher used the most common internal consistency measure known as cronbach alpha (α). It may be mentioned that its value varies from 0 to 1 but, satisfactorily value is required to be more than 0.6 for the scale to be reliable. (Malhotra, 2002). The recommended value of 0.7 is used as a cut off of reliability. Data Analysis is the processing of data collecting to make meaningful information out of them (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). Data will be collected from questionnaires. Quantitative data will

analyze using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 20).

4.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The study was guided by the following objectives, to exam the effects of Foreign Intervention, Foreign Military Intervention, and Foreign Electoral Intervention on Domestic Policy. The study employed a survey research design in data collection. This research employed quantitative data collection method whereby data was gathered by the use of closed ended questionnaires which were self-administered. Factor analysis was used to assess the validity and Cronbach alpha to assess reliability of the questionnaire.

The first objective of the study was to establish Effects of Foreign Intervention on Domestic Policy in Somalia case study Mogadishu. Results showed that there was a weak negative and highly significant correlation between Foreign Intervention and Domestic Policy ($r = -.438, P < 0.05$) A critical look at the Foreign Intervention literature reveals that there are some key factors that are considered to be of great significance for the integration of Foreign Intervention and Domestic Policy to occur. They include involvement of public servants and educators in Foreign Intervention and Domestic Policy, interrelationship between them.

The second objective of the study was to determine the effects of effects of foreign Military intervention on domestic policy in Mogadishu-Somalia. Results indicated that effects of foreign Military interventions are statistically influence on Domestic Policy ($p < 0.05$). There was a moderate negative and highly significant correlation between foreign military intervention and Domestic policy ($r = -.559, P < 0.05$). If the value of the p is less than 0.05 it is significant. The study wanted to exam the effects of foreign intervention on domestic policy. From the findings indicated in table 4.5.2 most of the respondents agreed that foreign military intervention can implement foreign policies with a mean of 3.02 being obtained.

The last objective of the study was to establish the effects of foreign electoral intervention on domestic policy in Mogadishu-Somalia. The study findings showed that Electoral intervention was statistically associated with Domestic Policy with ($p < 0.05$). There was a moderate negative and highly significant correlation between foreign electoral intervention and Domestic policy ($r = -.562, P < 0.01$). All these results imply that foreign intervention, foreign military intervention and Foreign Electoral intervention significantly influenced Domestic policy in Somalia case study Mogadishu.

5.0 CONCLUSIONS

The study ends that foreign intervention has a weak negative significant effect on Domestic Politics.

There was a moderate negative and highly significant correlation between foreign military intervention and Domestic politics. There was a moderate negative and highly significant correlation between foreign electoral intervention and Domestic policy. These findings indicate that all these three are explained statistically significant negative relationship with the Domestic Politics in Somalia case study Mogadishu.

6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The study recommended Inclusion of all Public servants in the collecting information because Public servants' participation in foreign intervention will improve the findings the research.
2. The researcher recommends enforcement of the domestic reconciliation, justice and peace encouragement.
3. The researcher recommends investigating the effect of foreign intervention on peace building in Somalia.

REFERENCES

1. Bélanger, L., Duchesne, É., & Paquin, J. (2005). *Foreign Interventions and Secessionist Movements: The Democratic Factor. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique*, 38, 435–462. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423905040643>
2. Besteman, C. (2017a). *Experimenting in Somalia: The new security empire.* <https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499617729294>
3. Besteman, C. (2017b). *Experimenting in Somalia: The new security empire. Anthropological Theory*, 17(3), 404–420. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499617729294>
4. Citation, R. (2011). *and Civil Liberties The Effect of U . S . Intervention on Political Rights and Civil A Chancellor ' s Honors.*
5. Corstange, D., & Marinov, N. (2012). *Taking Sides in Other People's Elections: The Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention. American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3), 655–670. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00583.x>
6. Dunning, T. (2004). *Conditioning the effects of aid: Cold war politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa. International Organization*, 58(2), 409–423. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582073>
7. Finnemore, M. (1996). *Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, 153–175. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2586196>
8. Geddes, B. (2002). *The Effect of Foreign Pressure on the Collapse of Authoritarian Regimes. Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association*, 1–32. Retrieved from <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=17985487&site=ehost-live>
9. Gourevitch, P. (1978). *The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics. International Organization (Vol. 32).* <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003201X>

10. Hesse, B. J. (2016). *Two Generations, Two Interventions in One of the World's Most-Failed States: The United States, Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia*. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 51(5), 573–593.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909614552919>
11. Ingiriis, M. H. (2018). *From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the 'War on Terror' exacerbated the conflict in Somalia*. *Third World Quarterly*, 65(97), 1–20.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1479186>
12. Izamin, K., Christie, D. J., States, U., Christie, K., & Frankel, J. D. (n.d.). No Title.
13. Koga, J. (2011). *Where do third parties intervene? Third parties' domestic institutions and military interventions in civil conflicts*. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(4), 1143–1166.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00684.x>
14. Levin, D. H. (2016). *When the great power gets a vote: The effects of great power electoral interventions on election results*. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(2), 189–202. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv016>
15. Levin, D. H. (2018). *A Vote for Freedom? The Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions on Regime Type*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 002200271877050. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718770507>
16. Lockyer, A. (2008). *Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources on the course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts*, 324.
17. Møller, B. (2009). *The Somali conflict: The role of external actor*, 1–60. Retrieved from <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/59871>
18. Mueller, J. C. (2018). *The evolution of political violence: The case of Somalia's Al-Shabaab*. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 30(1), 116–141. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1165213>
19. Publications, S. (2018). *Political , Economic , and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention*, 59(3), 363–376.
20. Putnam, R. D. (1988). *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*. *International Organization* (Vol. 42). <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027697>
21. Supervisor, P., Reader, P., & Reader, P. S. (2018). *A Project Submitted by*.
22. Tull, K. (2018). *Humanitarian interventions in Ethiopia responding to acute watery*, 1–12.
23. Wennesland, B. M. E., & Eide, B. M. (2013). *The U.S. Involvement in Somalia in the post-Cold War Years: An Illustration of the Tension Between Interests and Principles in American Foreign Policy*, 4. Retrieved from <https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/35633>
24. Western, J. (2002). *Sources of humanitarian intervention: Beliefs, information, and advocacy in the U.S. decisions on Somalia and Bosnia*. *International Security*, 26(4), 112–142. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228802753696799>
25. Williams, P. D. (2013). *Fighting for peace in Somalia: AMISOM's seven strategic challenges*.

Journal of International Peacekeeping, 17(3–4), 222–247. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18754112-1704004>