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THE INDIAN PATENT (AMENDMENTS) ACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD PHARMACEUTICAL TRADE INCLUDING THE RESULTS OF NOVARTIS v. INDIA

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ABSTRACT
In recent decades, numerous countries and global associations have attempted to homogenize the laws representing licensed innovation. The endeavor at institutionalization, be that as it may, has not been free of dissent, especially as to the laws relating to pharmaceutical licenses. This is because of the proceeding with strain that exists between expansive, multinational pharmaceutical organizations (MNCs), and creating countries that need both the foundation and money to build up their own particular self-subsisting pharmaceutical industries.

This research paper gives a short review of Indian patent law as it identifies with pharmaceuticals, considers the difficulties the law is right now confronting, and recommends some conceivable ways that India may wish to approach those difficulties. Part II gives a superficial exchange of India's pharmaceutical industry and its place on the planet today. Part III follows the historical backdrop of Indian patent law. Part IV centers on the developing globalization of protected innovation law and India's association in the WTO and adherence to TRIPS. Part V portrays TRIPS Section 3(d) and its necessities for patentability, and Part VI gives a procedural history of current cases and late choices in India including pharmaceutical licenses, with an accentuation on the Novartis case. Part VII contacts upon the TRIPS-consistence issue with segment 3(d). At long last, Part VIII introduces a portion of the contentions of advocates of reasonable medicinal services, who consider the Novartis choice a triumph for India and other creating nations in urgent need of cheap prescriptions.

This research paper presumes that, while the Indian Supreme Court's decision in the Novartis case may have helpful ramifications for the creating scene and people needing moderate medications, it at last speaks to a squandered open door for the Court to clear up segment 3(d), which would advance remote speculation and good development and development in the local pharmaceutical and biotech businesses.

KEYWORDS: institutionalization, patent law, pharmaceutical industry
contending requests for economical medications and successful protected innovation insurance, the Indian government made a law that managed security to pharmaceuticals just on the off chance that they constituted pristine concoction substances or upgraded the restorative "adequacy" of known substances. This law, which is arranged under segment 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, has not sit well with some MNCs, including the Swiss organization Novartis. Following the disavowal of a patent for its leukemia tranquilize, Glivec, Novartis tested the legitimacy of segment 3(d) under TRIPS and the Indian Constitution. The Indian Supreme Court ruled against Novartis in a choice that has, and will keep on having, expansive ramifications for MNCs, the Indian pharmaceutical industry, and individuals around the globe needing reasonable drugs.

INTRODUCTION TO INDIA'S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

Since World War II, the universal pharmaceutical industry has developed significantly. The requirement for anti-toxins amid the war drove numerous organizations to put additional time and assets into the innovative work of new drugs. The years following the war saw a fast extension of the business as organizations built up themselves as MNCs by invading outside markets. Today, the worldwide pharmaceutical industry is commanded by few MNCs. These enterprises are headquartered in created countries and convey a lot of money related clout. Such partnerships, in any case, are not found in numerous creating countries. This is basically because of the elevated amounts of aptitude, preparing, innovation, and capital important to deliver new or existing drugs. As a result, a few creating countries have developed subject to medicate imports from different nations, for example, India.

Over the years, India has set up itself as one of the real makers of reasonable bland drugs. The Indian pharmaceutical industry today is "viewed as the world's third-biggest by volume" and, starting at 2010, delivers around 20% of the world's non-specific drugs. Experts foresee India's pharmaceutical industry to develop to an estimation of $74 billion by 2020, setting India as "a worldwide pioneer in the pharmaceutical industry." India isn't just a central exporter of medications, yet in addition the essential maker of medications for its own population. India is one of just two nations on the planet where nonexclusive medication makers control a bigger offer of the household pharmaceutical market than huge MNCs. A couple of indigenous firms are equipped for both non-specific medication generation and innovative work, while numerous littler organizations practice solely in figuring out medications from overseas. Yet while the creation of medications isn't an issue in India, general access to drugs is. The reasonableness of pharmaceuticals and absence of a far reaching medical coverage framework have vigorously impacted the advancement and improvement of India's patent laws and its cooperation in global protected innovation assertions.

HISTORY OF INDIA'S PATENT LAWS

India passed its first patent law in 1856 amid British frontier rule. This law depended on the British Patent Law of 1852, which gave benefits to creators to a time of fourteen years. Following various alterations, this law later offered path to the Inventions and Designs Act of 1888. Although India was starting to industrialize as of now, its pharmaceutical industry was still in its earliest stages. In 1911, the British supplanted the Inventions and Designs Act of 1888 with the Indian Patents and Design Act. The 1911 Act built up India's first arrangement of patent organization and stayed basically until 1972. As with the 1856 Act and every single resulting act, the 1911 Act accommodated the patentability of pharmaceutical items and thusly empowered outside organizations to obstruct the generation of their licensed medications in India. Domestic medication creation stayed stale up until World War II. With its freedom from Britain in 1947, India was stood up to with various difficulties. As one of the poorest nations on the planet, the inexorably dangerous issue of giving reasonable social insurance to the majority was not lost on Indian leaders. Because moderate human services normally involves moderate pharmaceuticals, Indian authorities started a broad audit of the 1911 Indian Patents and Design Act soon after independence.

The Government of India named two councils to initiate this exertion: the Patent Enquire Committee (1948– 50) and the Patents Revision Committee (1957– 59). The objective was to "survey the patent laws in India with a view to guarantee that the patent framework was more helpful for national interests." The reports of the two master panels made ready for the possible order of the Patents Act of 1970. The India Patents Act of 1970, which canceled the 1911 Act and produced results in 1972, significantly affected the pharmaceutical industry. Instead of offering acknowledgment to item licenses, which was the standard among created countries, the Act held assurance just for process patents. Under this patent administration, Indian medication makers could duplicate pharmaceutical items that were generally protected in remote countries, prompting a blast in the generation of non-specific drugs. By leaving from the unforgiving, "draconian" patent laws of the British provincial time, the Indian pharmaceutical industry
could succeed, cultivating the development of the nation's "indigenous logical and innovative limit."

INDIA AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

The World Trade Organization came into existence on January 1, 1995, and along with it came the TRIPS Agreement. "The TRIPS Agreement is, by its coverage, the most comprehensive international instrument on intellectual property rights," instituting high minimum standards on a variety of forms of intellectual property. Industrialized nations pushed the agreement as a means of strengthening intellectual property rights because infringement of those rights was seen as "trade distorting." The developing world, however, feared that the more stringent patent laws in TRIPS would drive up costs and stifle the generic drug industry. Like many developing nations, India was initially opposed to TRIPS. Nevertheless, as a member of the WTO, India was required to modify its domestic intellectual property laws in order to comply with the agreement. Although India had to implement certain provisions of TRIPS immediately, article 65.2 of the agreement granted developing nations a transition period for the implementation of other provisions. One such provision gave nations without patent protection for pharmaceutical products a ten-year period to bring their laws into compliance with TRIPS.

Thus, India had until January 1, 2005, to make its patent laws relating to pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals TRIPS-compliant. Indian law went through three stages between 1995 and 2005 in order to conform to TRIPS. First, in 1999, India instituted the "mailbox" requirement of article 70.9, which enabled entities to submit product patent applications for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals to the patent office that would be held until examination in 2005. Second, India introduced the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002, which further integrated Indian law by extending patent terms to twenty years as stipulated by TRIPS. Third, and lastly, the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 brought India into compliance with TRIPS by giving full patent protection to pharmaceutical products. It is this final Amendment that has been the source of controversy in recent years.

INDIAN PATENT LAW TODAY

While India made the necessary adjustments to its laws to satisfy the requirements of TRIPS, "criticism and concern about the effect of pharmaceutical patents on domestic drug prices compelled the Indian government to retain legitimate means for balancing innovation incentives against the social costs of pharmaceutical product patents." A significant means by which the Indian government can “limit the reach of product patent protection” is section 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005. Section 3(d) essentially provides for a tougher standard for securing patents. Companies that introduce new versions of their pharmaceutical products must demonstrate that the new versions are “therapeutically more beneficial than earlier versions on which patents had expired.” Through section 3(d), India is able to prevent “ever greening,” which critics characterize as a “common abusive patenting practice” where pharmaceutical companies attempt to extend patent protection by making minor changes to existing drugs. Predictably, India’s strict patent regime has spawned discontent among large multinational pharmaceutical corporations interested in tapping into India’s growing market.

THE NOVARTIS CASE

Recently, some large multinational pharmaceutical corporations have taken their frustrations with the Indian patent system to court. Novartis’s struggles with the Indian patent regime began in 1993, when it filed patents around the world for its synthesis of the molecule imatinib. According to Novartis, however, the molecule can only be administered to cancer patients as imatinib mesylate. The resulting drug is currently patented in forty countries as Glivec (Gleevec in the United States). Following the formation of the WTO and passage of TRIPS in 1995, Novartis filed a patent application for Glivec in India in accordance with the “mailbox” requirement.

In January 2006, when the Glivec patent came before the Madras Patent Office, it was rejected on the grounds that it was "an unpatentable modification of an existing substance, imatinib." Pursuant to section 3(d) of the 2005 Act, the Patent Office concluded that Glivec failed to show "novelty and inventiveness," as well as increased efficacy as required by the law. In response, Novartis petitioned the Madras High Court in May 2006, arguing that the Controller General of Patents "erred in rejecting the Gleevec patent application, that Section 3(d) was not compliant with TRIPS, and that Section 3(d) was vague, ambiguous and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India because it was discriminatory against Novartis.”

The Madras High Court heard Novartis’s challenges to section 3(d)’s constitutionality and compliance with TRIPS, while the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) reviewed the Patent Controller’s rejection of the Glivec patent. Both the High Court and the IPAB returned decisions against Novartis. With regard to the TRIPS compliance question, however, the Madras High Court simply concluded that it was beyond the Court’s jurisdiction, and that the proper venue for such an issue...
would be the WTO. Novartis subsequently appealed to the Indian Supreme Court.

The Indian Supreme Court followed suit, handing down a decision on April 1, 2013, in which it echoed the previous court rulings that Novartis failed to demonstrate Glivec’s enhanced or superior efficacy in accordance with section 3(d). The Court, however, did not deem it necessary to articulate a single, definitive definition of “enhanced (therapeutic) efficacy” in order to render a decision. The Court also noted that its ruling in the Novartis case should not be read as a general prohibition of all patents for “incremental inventions of chemical and pharmaceutical substances.”

**IS SECTION 3(d) IN VIOLATION OF TRIPS?**

One of Novartis' significant claims was that area 3(d) isn't in consistence with TRIPS. Some analysts contend that, if this issue were to go before the WTO, it is profoundly far-fetched that the association as to the TRIPS consistence question, in any case, the Madras High Court basically presumed that it was past the Court's ward, and that the correct scene for such an issue would be the WTO. Novartis accordingly spoke to the Indian Supreme Court. The Indian Supreme Court stuck to this same pattern, passing on a choice on April 1, 2013, in which it reverberated the past court decisions that Novartis neglected to exhibit Glivec's improved or unrivaled viability as per segment 3(d).

The Court, be that as it may, did not regard it important to express a solitary, authoritative meaning of "upgraded (restorative) adequacy" so as to render a decision. The Court likewise noticed that its decision in the Novartis case ought not to be perused as a general disallowance of all licenses for "incremental creations of synthetic and pharmaceutical substances."

**THE NOVARTIS DECISION AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS**

A noteworthy motivation behind why the Novartis case drew significant consideration from the worldwide network was the effect the choice would likely have on the accessibility of non-specific medications in the creating scene. Numerous advocates of reasonable medicinal services dreaded a ruling for Novartis would be a "capital punishment" for patients attempting to pay for treatment. The test of giving moderate pharmaceuticals is particularly articulated in nations like India, where there is no created protection system. The worry over moderate medications in India and somewhere else was a critical factor in the IPAB's choice to reaffirm the patent office's disavowal of the Glivec patent application. Section 3(b) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 holds that "licenses can't be conceded to an innovation, the essential or planned utilize or business abuse of which could be in opposition to open request, or profound quality, or which makes genuine biases human, creature or vegetation or wellbeing or to the environment."

Following this arrangement, the IPAB inferred that the Glivec patent fizzled not just because of the medication's absence of upgraded viability in accordance with area 3(d), yet additionally in light of the fact that its extreme cost was viewed as setting the medication "past the range of the regular man." The Supreme Court likewise communicated "bewildment" over the exorbitant cost of Glivec. Indeed, the judges even whined to Novartis about the medication's cost before rendering their decision. Novartis, be that as it may, has endeavored to fight off these protests by attracting open thoughtfulness regarding the way that 90% of Indian patients determined to have the type of leukemia that Glivec is intended to battle get the medication for nothing through Novartis' gift program. But not every person is persuaded; as one pundit weeped over, "wellbeing strategy can't be prisoner to corporate philanthropy.

**THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION OF SECTION 3(d) AND GREATER PROTECTION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY**

Despite the fact that the Indian Supreme Court's decision in the Novartis case may have advantageous ramifications for the creating scene and people needing reasonable medications, there are two outstanding issues with it. In the first place, area 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 still requires more noteworthy elucidation. The Indian Supreme Court's choice leaves enough uncertainty in regards to the importance of "upgraded adequacy" that both multinational and Indian pharmaceutical organizations must keep on pursuing industry licenses without the advantage of a brilliant line run the show. Second, the Court's tight elucidation of area 3(d) will probably debilitate future remote interest in India and conceivably hurt India's own developing pharmaceutical industry.

As contacted upon in past parts, a waiting issue with segment 3(d) is the uncertainty encompassing the importance of "upgrade of the known adequacy of a known substance." Paul Herrling, head of corporate research at Novartis and seat of its Institute for Tropical Disease, had initially trusted that the Novartis case would bring about some lucidity in regards to area 3(d)'s language. Prior to the Court's decision, Herrling revealed to Reuters that "the patent for Glivec isn't generally the issue here it is only a case of us needing clear legitimate clearness about what sort of advancement is patentable." Defining "improved viability" with a specific end goal to make a splendid line govern, notwithstanding, is simpler said than done? Teacher Basheer keeps up that upgraded viability can
without much of a stretch be understood to profit either side of the debate. If improved adequacy is given the limited, "helpful efficacy" definition, as it was by both the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court in the Novartis matter, at that point few derivate drugs (i.e., existing medications or substance intensifies that have been altered somehow) will make the cut for patentability under segment 3(d). Under this development of the term, Glivec was denied a patent in light of the fact that, while the beta gem type of imatinib mesylate is more secure and less demanding to utilize, it isn't any more viable for the genuine treatment of cancer.

Thus, pharmaceutical enterprises, for example, Novartis have a tendency to be agreeable to a lower standard and more extensive meaning of improved adequacy in order to incorporate alterations identifying with a current medication's wellbeing and simplicity of use. Though it might create the impression that the Indian courts did in actuality give a clearer significance to segment 3(d) by following a strict and tight elucidation of "upgraded viability," the Supreme Court eventually left the issue open. The Court engaged the conclusions of advocates on the two sides of the tight/wise definition debate, yet closed it was pointless for it to express a complete standard for improved viability that could be connected in future patent disputes. Rather, the restricted approach the Court took in the Novartis case was only to judge the patentability of Glivec under the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005. Future cases that an incremental advancement, for example, another medication's similar increment in bioavailability or decrease in poisonous quality, constitutes an upgrade of remedial adequacy will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

This outstanding vulnerability in the matter of what may in certainty be patentable under the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, and the constrained point of reference set by the Court's Novartis choice expecting medications to meet a specific level of upgraded viability, will, at any rate for the not so distant future, dishearten outside interest in India. While the Supreme Court asked for that its choice not be perused as a disallowance on licenses for all incremental innovation, actually numerous MNCs will scrutinize their capacity to secure licenses for their items in India. Outside firms will just keep away from putting resources into India, maybe by withholding the acquaintance of new items with the Indian market, or by declining to make new lucrative employments there. This plausibility is upsetting even with India's expanding need to draw in remote interest so as to support its feeble cash, and to meet the requests of its developing center class. Additionally, the Novartis choice is impeding to advancement and will probably hurt India's own particular developing pharmaceutical industry.

Chip Davis, the official VP of backing at the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, portrayed the development condition in India as "weakening," and said that the ongoing Novartis choice features his gathering's conviction that the Indian government and courts don't "perceive the estimation of advancement and the estimation of solid licensed innovation. By neglecting to advance more extensive insurance for pharmaceutical licenses, India risks hosing the sort of advancement that prompts the formation of new medicines. Under the overall elucidation of segment 3(d), it is exceptionally hard to procure a patent for a medication with incremental upgrades since it will probably neglect to meet the "improved remedial viability" threshold. Although numerous reasonable medication advocates see this translation as a viable methods for guaranteeing moderate medications and keeping the act of ever greening by huge MNCs, it eventually hurts household tranquilize organizations that have quite recently as of late put resources into their own particular research and development. Because India's significant local pharmaceutical organizations still can't seem to gather the framework and cash-flow to make real jumps in sedate advancement, various them have concentrated on "incremental innovation." One Indian parliamentarian recommended that licenses ought to be made accessible for incremental advancements since "Indian researchers don't have the know-how or cash-flow to concoct new synthetic elements, yet do have the know-how to make improvements." As is the general contention for the assurance of protected innovation, the inability to guarantee patent scope for even these incremental creations will undoubtedly smoother development, which is a shocking prospect in a nation that is rapidly rising as a worldwide player in the domain of science and innovation, and will probably be in such a situation for a considerable length of time to come.

CONCLUSION

The worry for securing access to moderate medications is a genuine one, and there are solid good contentions for why expanding patent assurance for the results of capable MNCs works just to hurt the basic man. The truth, notwithstanding, is that the security of protected innovation rights gives these companies the required motivating force to concoct and produce the medications on which patients around the globe depend, regardless of whether marked or non-specific. In principle, India could proceed down its ebb and flow way where its generics industry basically figures out the pharmaceuticals that are investigated and grown somewhere else.

Yet, in the event that India wants to develop into its part as a noteworthy logical and innovative powerhouse, at that point it must work to secure
protected innovation rights, rather than doing the absolute minimum to guarantee consistence with TRIPS. It is no puzzle why Indian pharmaceutical patent law has built up the way it has, yet India has additionally changed essentially since it established its first patent laws. The Novartis case was, from numerous points of view, a missed open door for India to rethink its place in the global civil argument over licensed innovation rights. The choice may serve the prompt interests of India's generics industry and supporters of reasonable pharmaceuticals, however may eventually thwart the development of innovative work, both at home and abroad.