Particularly since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, the strategic competition between the US and the PRC for economic opportunities and political influence in the developing world has been compared to US and Soviet Union competition for the “Third World” during the Cold War. This essay contends that even while the form and setting of strategic competition now are very different from those of the second half of the 20th century, there are still many lessons to be learned from the US grand strategy of containment. The Soviet Union’s (USSR) motivations, which included the need to protect against external dangers and preserve domestic legitimacy of the regime, were comparable to those driving Chinese behaviour. The PRC’s ability to maintain rising living standards for the Chinese populace is a key factor in its legitimacy. The PRC does not, however, think that time is on its favour given the mounting demographic and economic restrictions. Therefore, before these restrictions become mandatory, BRI’s strategic economic goals entail taking on more financial risk in exchange for the possibility of bigger and speedier profits. Common misunderstandings about PRC aims are dispelled when it is realised that profitability is the BRI’s primary goal. The study comes to the conclusion that the US and its allies should (1) clearly define which PRC practises they are trying to contain; (2) respond by offering foreign assistance to developing countries that links more strongly to US economic interests; and (3) more actively incentivize commitment to liberal democratic values and sound development practises rather than by trying to match BRI spending symmetrically.